



WEEKLY THREAT ADVISORY NO. 734

(16 - 22 Jan 2026)

Summary of Threat Activities and Conclusion

1. Pirate and maritime crime activity in East Africa and the Indian Ocean HRA reported an increase in piracy activities. US Naval Intelligence has issued warnings featured in WETA No. 696. Following a successful hijack, 2 weeks ago by pirates on the coast near Nadarbeyla, Puntland, this past week saw no reports of any attack.
2. Electronic Interference:
 - 2.1. Concentrations of GNSS Interference around Jebel Ali and Fujairah in the Arabian Gulf, and around Yanbu and Sudan, appear to have decreased to lower intensity levels, compared to last week's report.
 - 2.2. The concentrations for the centre of the Red Sea remain high, and the clustering around the Suez Canal remains consistently low. The concentrations in the vicinity of Bandar e-Pars and the Strait of Hormuz have decreased somewhat.
3. Despite the seemingly low pirate-related activities, the threat level remains high due to the ongoing political volatility and tension in the region, which criminal and pirate syndicates could exploit. Piracy, as with all criminal activities, thrives on surprise for success. It is when nobody expects it that the perpetrators will strike and achieve their intent!
4. Based on the geographical development, the general forecast is that the piracy situation will persist even though the conflict between Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, Iran and other Arab factions seems to stabilise. The new political problem brewing in Syria may be another flashpoint that sparks a new conflict among the warring factions. In the meantime, pirate and criminal syndicates operating in Somalia will exploit the turmoil and chaos to conduct opportunistic attacks against defenceless commercial shipping. UMS HQ warns all stakeholders that the maritime industry should brace for



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increased pirate activity as the post-monsoon season brings calmer seas. In WETA No. 689, UMS HQ issued an Annexe for instructions on enhanced measures during this period.

5. Two U.S. Maritime Advisories (2025-009 and 2025-010) were issued on 13 August 2025. These advisories provide clarity on specific threats faced in The Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. For maritime industry questions on these advisories, contact the Global Maritime Operational Threat Response Coordination Centre at GMCC@uscg.mil. Supplemental information about U.S. Maritime Alerts and Advisories, including subscription details, may be found at <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci>. These advisories will automatically expire on 9 February 2026.
6. U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-009: Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman - Iranian Illegal Boarding / Detention / Seizure
This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-002. Although there is no specific threat to U.S.-flagged vessels, commercial vessels transiting this region may be at risk of being illegally boarded and detained or seized by Iranian forces. Iranian forces have utilised small boats and helicopters during boarding operations, and have attempted to force commercial vessels into Iranian territorial waters.
7. U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-010: Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean - Piracy/Armed Robbery / Kidnapping for Ransom
This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-003. Although there are currently no specific piracy threats to U.S. flagged commercial vessels in this region, piracy continues to pose a general threat to all commercial vessels operating in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. Since January 2025, there have been three reported boarding/hijacking incidents. Pirates have utilized fishing vessels as motherships. While the overall threat has diminished, the piracy threat still remains out to 600NM from the coast of Somalia. Specific case details are available at <https://www.oni.navy.mil/ONI-Reports/Shipping-Threat-Reports/Worldwide-Threat-to-Shipping/>



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8. U.S. Maritime Advisory 025-008: Gulf of Guinea / Armed Robbery / Kidnapping for Ransom Issued on 18 June 2025. This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-014 and will automatically expire on 15 December 2025. Piracy, Armed Robbery, and Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) continue to pose significant threats to vessels and crews operating in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) as well as to mariners onboard a vessel, or transiting to or from a vessel in the GoG. Details of incidents in the GoG can be found in the Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping reports, posted at <https://www.oni.navy.mil/ONI-Reports/Shipping-Threat-Reports/Worldwide-Threat-to-Shipping/>. For any maritime industry questions about this advisory, contact GMCC@uscg.mil. Supplemental information may also be found on the MARAD Office of Maritime Security website at <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ports/office-security/office-maritime-security>.
9. Joint Maritime Information Centre Update No. 003
 - 9.1. As of this report dated 14 June 2025 1300 UTC, there are no changes to JMIC Advisory Update 002. The regional threat level remains significant as strikes continue from both Iran and Israel. Regarding the maritime, the Strait of Hormuz remains open and commercial traffic continues to flow uninterrupted. JMIC and UKMTO have received no recent reports of electronic interference in the SoH.
 - 9.2. JMIC advises companies to conduct due diligence before accepting unconfirmed media reports in the maritime.
 - 9.3. The JMIC continues to monitor the situation closely and will provide timely updates should there be any changes. Monitor the UKMTO and MSCIO website for updated information.
 - 9.4. Daily updates will be provided unless there is a reason to provide more timely information.



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9.5. Background: Based on open-source media, Israeli authorities forwarded an ultimatum to both Iran and the United States, stating that a nuclear agreement must be reached by Sunday, 15 June, between the two countries. If not, Israeli leadership has the intent to initiate military action against Iran. The statement introduces a short operational pause until Sunday to allow diplomatic efforts.

9.6. Summary 14 June:

9.6.1. Following IDF unilateral military operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran on 13 June, Iran retaliated by firing waves of ballistic missiles at Israel.

9.6.2. Iranian government media warned that American military bases in the region could also become targets as the conflict expands. Given the proximity of regional flashpoints to major maritime routes and chokepoints, the potential for rapid escalation involving the maritime environment should not be discounted. The threat from the Houthis, who have publicly stated their intent to respond if the U.S. is perceived to be involved, increases the threat of a broader regional impact.

9.7. Situation 14 June: •

9.7.1. Iran and Israel traded missiles and airstrikes on Saturday 14 June 2025.

9.7.2. Military operations commenced early morning on 13 June, 2025 to include missile strikes and drone activity. Marine operators have reported significant electronic interference in the region.

9.7.3. Diplomatic efforts between the United States and Iran concerning nuclear negotiations have reportedly stalled.

9.7.4. Rhetoric from regional actors has intensified, increasing the probability of a military operations involving direct engagement. International diplomats are calling for calm and diplomacy.



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9.7.5. There is a possibility that military operations could spill over beyond bilateral hostilities into the wider region 3.

9.8. Maritime Implications:

9.8.1. While there are no confirmed indications of an immediate threat to maritime traffic, the following scenarios would prompt a reassessment

9.8.2. Use of ballistic or cruise missiles near major maritime chokepoints.

9.8.3. Targeting of western-aligned or affiliated commercial vessels.

9.8.4. Collateral risks from regional conflict expanding to coastal, offshore, or port infrastructure.

9.9. Recommended Actions:

9.9.1. Owners and charterers continue to conduct thorough threat and risk assessments well in advance of entering the Arabian Gulf and implement necessary security and risk mitigation measures while operating in the region. As the situation remains fluid, pay close attention to the changing environment.

9.9.2. Closely monitor all electronic aids and communication networks for electronic interference. Be ready with alternative options should navigation aids fail.

9.9.3. Threat Level: Threat in the maritime remains elevated until further notice for vessels operating in or transiting the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Northern Arabian Sea.

9.9.4. Situational Monitoring: Shipmasters and CSOs are advised to maintain close contact with regional maritime security centers (UKMTO and MSCIO) and monitor official government and military advisories.



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9.9.5. Communications: Vessels should report any unusual activity or security incidents to UKMTO via established Voluntary Reporting Schemes and keep communication equipment manned and functional at all times.

9.9.6. Planning: Companies are urged to apply BMP MS and review contingency plans for routing, crew welfare, and emergency response in the event of a significant regional escalation and ensure JMIC Bridge Emergency Reference Cards are available to bridge watchkeepers. The use of full speed maybe be a consideration

9.9.7. JMIC recommends following Best Management Practices and industry recommended MSTC-ME routing when transiting the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Northern Arabian Sea. Given the current operational pause, this window may be used to move, load or discharge vessels and if necessary, reposition into international waters. Should strikes occur, consider staying within territorial waters.

9.10. Additional Notes: This update is based on the most recent development over the past 24-hours.

10. The Joint Maritime Information Centre Advisory Note 007/25

10.1. The Joint Maritime Information Centre (JMIC) issues this advisory to alert commercial shipping and associated maritime stakeholders regarding a recent declaration by the Houthi-controlled 'Harakat al-Houthis Operations Command Council' (HOCC). The statement, released via affiliated media channels, indicates an expansion of their threat posture in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. According to the declaration beginning 20 May 2025, vessels that have called at the Israeli port of Haifa or are alleged to have collaborated with Israeli entities may now be subject to targeted action by HOCC elements.

10.2. This expanded criteria explicitly includes sister ships—vessels under the same ownership, management, or operator network—as part of the new targeting posture. This implies that a vessel may be deemed hostile by HOCC not due to its own operational history, but solely because another



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vessel in its corporate structure has engaged in Israeli port activity. The risk applies regardless of flag, cargo, or current voyage route. ***JMIC notes that this is very similar to the May 2024 Houthi Phase 4 announcement of attacks expanded to include ships whose owners/operators have vessels visiting Israeli ports.***

10.3. In response, JMIC strongly urges all shipping companies and operators with vessels transiting the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden to:

10.3.1. Conduct a comprehensive audit of any Haifa, Israel port calls within their fleet, including those of sister vessels, time-chartered vessels, and vessels under common beneficial ownership or technical management.

10.3.2. Evaluate their digital footprint, including AIS transmission logs, vessel-tracking platforms, and public maritime databases, for any historical linkage that could be interpreted by HOCC-affiliated actors as grounds for targeting.

10.3.3. Reinforce cybersecurity and information control protocols, particularly concerning voyage routing, port call data, and affiliations that may be available through open-source intelligence (OSINT) methods.

10.4. JMIC will continue to monitor the situation and provide updates as required.

11. U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-006: Worldwide - Foreign Adversarial Technological, Physical and Cyber Influence. Issued on 9 April 2025. This advisory seeks to alert maritime stakeholders of potential vulnerabilities to maritime port equipment, networks, operating systems, software, and infrastructure. Foreign companies manufacture, install, and maintain port equipment that create vulnerabilities to global maritime infrastructure information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The U.S. Government in the past few years has published several documents illuminating the risks associated with integrating and utilizing China's state-supported National Public Information Platform for Transportation and



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Logistics (LOGINK), Nuctech scanners, and automated ship-to-shore cranes worldwide. For more information about U.S. Maritime Alerts and Advisories, please visit <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/>. This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-011 and will automatically expire on 6 October 2025.

12. U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-005: Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Somali Basin - Houthi Attacks on Commercial Vessels. Issued on 28 March 2025. This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-001. On 15 March, U. S. forces commenced strikes against targets used by Houthi terrorists in Yemen to launch attacks against commercial and military vessels operating within international shipping lanes. Houthi forces have subsequently threatened to strike U.S. assets, including commercial vessels, and are at high risk until further notice. For maritime industry questions about this advisory, contact the Global Maritime Operational Threat Response Coordination Center at GMCC@uscg.mil. Supplemental information about U.S. Maritime Alerts and Advisories, including subscription details, may be found at: <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci>. This message will automatically expire on 24 September 2025.
13. US Naval Intelligence has issued a new advisory. U.S. Maritime Advisory (2025-004: Black Sea and Sea of Azov - Military Combat Operations) Issued on 5 March 2025. This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-012. Since February 2022, projectiles have reportedly struck commercial vessels and experienced explosions in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. There have also been reports of moored and drifting naval mines. While some past actions may have targeted specific commercial vessels due to their association with certain countries or their activity, the potential remains for miscalculation or misidentification, resulting in a high risk of damage to commercial vessels in the region. For more information about U.S. Maritime Alerts and Advisories, including subscription details, please visit <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci>. This advisory will automatically expire on 1 September 2025.
14. US Naval Intelligence has issued three advisories, and all stakeholders, including Masters, crew members, Team Leaders, and maritime marshals, are to heed these warnings.



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- 15. Three U.S. Maritime Advisories (2025-001, 2025-002, and 2025-003) were issued on 14 February 2025.** These advisories clarify specific threats faced in the Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Strait of Hormuz, and Indian Ocean. For maritime industry questions on these advisories, contact the Global Maritime Operational Threat Response Coordination Center at GMCC@uscg.mil. Supplemental information about U.S. Maritime Alerts and Advisories, including subscription details, may be found at <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci>. These advisories will automatically expire on 11 August 2025.
- 16. U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-001: Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden - Houthi Attacks on Commercial Vessels.** This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-008. On 19 January 2025, Houthi officials in Yemen claimed that they were ceasing their attacks on U.S.- and U.K.- flagged, owned, and affiliated commercial vessels; commercial vessels partially owned or managed by Israeli individuals or entities; and commercial vessels bound for Israeli ports. Due to current uncertainty regarding these Houthi announcements, commercial vessels remain at risk from terrorism and other hostile actions from the Houthis when transiting this region until further notice.
- 17. U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-002: Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman - Iranian Illegal Boarding / Detention / Seizure.** This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-009. Although there is no specific threat to U.S.- flagged vessels, commercial vessels transiting this region may be at risk of being illegally boarded and detained or seized by Iranian forces. Iranian forces have utilized small boats and helicopters during boarding operations and have attempted to force commercial vessels into Iranian territorial waters.
- 18. U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-003: Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean - Piracy/Armed Robbery / Kidnapping for Ransom.** This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-010. Recent cases of piracy pose a general threat to all commercial vessels operating in this region. Since November 2023, there have been seven reported boarding/hijacking incidents. Pirates have utilized captured fishing vessels as motherships. Successful or attempted boardings and suspicious approaches have been reported up to



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960 NM off the coast of Somalia. Specific case details are available at <https://www.oni.navy.mil/ONI-Reports/Shipping-Threat-Reports/Worldwide-Threat-to-Shipping/>.

19. There have been some calls by some ignorant commercial bodies that do not understand the threat deeply and well enough to call for the removal of AST onboard commercial vessels due to concerns that the onboard AST might cause an incident with approaching naval craft. While the concerns are reasonable, the proposed solution to remove the onboard AST is highly unprofessional and dangerous. Implementing it would make the commercial vessels concerned 'sitting ducks' in the face of attacks by Somali pirates who take advantage of the chaos and distractions caused by the conflict. Some intelligence sources have established that some pirate action groups are working in cahoot with the Houthis. Therefore, we should see the increased attacks by Somali pirates linked with the Houthis activities in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. For this reason, UMS HQ instructed how UMS Maritime Marshals will respond and behave when confronted with this situation.
20. All vessels in the vicinity are, therefore, to exercise caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO.
21. In the latest quarterly report by UKMTO, it was reported that there has been an increased incidence of suspicious sightings compared to a year ago before the lifting off of the HRA by commercial shipping bodies. Intelligence agencies have unanimously agreed that there would be attempts by pirates' syndicates to exploit hopefully a relaxed attitude by the shipping community, and today we are seeing the manifestation of the situation happening. In other words, the possibility of a successful hijack can only be prevented if vessels have on-board armed security teams (AST) to deter and if necessary, prevent any attack and boarding by pirates.
22. The main message of the Quarterly Reporting by UKMTO is that piracy has been suppressed but not eradicated. So long as the socio-politico-economic problems of Somalia and Yemen are unresolved, the threat of piracy against commercial shipping will remain.
23. All Masters and UMS Maritime are advised to remain vigilant. The increased piracy-related activities in the waters of the Indian Ocean and East



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Africa/Red Sea have, in fact, been anticipated by intelligence agencies by the removal of the HRA by world commercial bodies but not by the War Committee, which assessed that the present situation has inadvertently increased the threat level.

24. UKMTO and other intelligence agencies have noticed increased activities by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). This recent development brings a new equation and range of challenges to the safety of commercial vessels transiting in waters that are prone to pirates' attacks in the Northern Indian Ocean and Southern Red Sea and maritime security operations. UMS HQ repeats the article on the subject in paragraph 31 given its importance in understanding the capabilities of UAV in maritime security operations (in particular paragraph 31.6) for a detailed exposition.

25. **2024-001-Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden, Northwestern Indian Ocean, Somali Basin, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz, and Persian Gulf-Threats to Commercial Vessels**

25.1. This advisory replaces and cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2023-011 and U.S. Maritime Alert 2024-001B

25.2. Issue: Regional conflict, military activity, and piracy pose significant threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas as evidenced by recent Houthi attacks and Somali piracy activity. The U.S. government is continually assessing the maritime security situation in the region to safeguard freedom of navigation, ensure the free flow of commerce, and protect U.S. vessels, personnel, and interests. The recent standup of Operation Prosperity Guardian is one of many examples of U.S. and international cooperative maritime security operations within this region. The following are currently deemed to be the most pressing threats to U.S.-flagged and U.S.-affiliated commercial vessels throughout this region.

25.3. **Houthi Hostile Actions:** Commercial vessels transiting the Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden are at an elevated risk of hostile actions from the Houthis. Hostile actions include one-way Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks; ballistic and cruise missile attacks; small arms fire from small boats; explosive boat attacks; and illegal



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boardings, detentions, and/or seizures. There have been at least 30 separate Houthi attacks on commercial vessels and one Houthi seizure of a commercial vessel in these areas, affecting over 55 nations since November 19, 2023. In November 2023, the Houthis conducted a helicopter-borne landing and seizure of a Bahamas-flagged commercial vessel in the Southern Red Sea. Entities claiming to be Yemeni authorities have also attempted to direct commercial vessels in the Southern Red Sea to divert to Yemen. These threats pose both direct and collateral risks to U.S.-flagged and U.S.-affiliated commercial vessels transiting in international shipping lanes, or otherwise operating in these areas.

25.3.1. U.S.-flagged commercial vessels operating in these areas are advised to remain as far as possible from Yemen's territorial sea without compromising navigational safety. Crewmembers should be especially vigilant when at anchor, operating in restricted maneuvering conditions, or proceeding at slow speeds.

25.3.2. Coordinate voyage planning with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) and consider their recommendations and guidance whenever possible. NAVCENT NCAGS stands a 24-hour watch and has the latest information on the current maritime security threats and the operational environment in this region.

25.3.3. The route taken through these areas, and timing of the transit, remains at the discretion of individual companies and vessel Masters. Transiting these areas during hours of darkness may frustrate efforts to target vessels.

25.3.4. Adherence to all U.S. and international requirements and guidance regarding operation of AIS remains the responsibility of individual companies and vessel Masters. Ships operating with AIS switched on and off have both been the object of Houthi attacks. Switching AIS off makes it marginally more difficult to track or target a ship but may also hinder the ability of coalition forces to provide support.



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- 25.3.5. U.S.-flagged commercial vessels are advised to provide hourly positional email updates to the NAVCENT NCAGS detachment when transiting these areas.
- 25.3.6. Maritime operators are advised to alert their crews to the fact that all electronic signals from their vessels pose a risk to maritime operations.
- 25.3.7. A missile strike on a Marshall Islands-flagged commercial tanker in the Gulf of Aden on January 26, 2024 resulted in a significant onboard fire. U.S.-flagged commercial vessels carrying flammable, explosive, or otherwise hazardous cargoes are strongly advised to reconsider transit through these areas. However, if planning voyages through these areas, vessels should take all prudent safety precautions, including thoroughly preparing for emergency responses, and considering carriage of additional safety and damage control preparedness supplies and equipment, such as those needed to extinguish fires.
- 25.3.8. If hailed on VHF by the Houthis, or entities claiming to be Yemeni authorities, and instructed to alter course to Al Hudaydah or another location on the northwest coast of Yemen, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should ignore the VHF call and continue their passage if safe to do so.
- 25.3.9. If the Houthis seek to board U.S.-flagged commercial vessels in these areas, the ship's Master should, if the safety of the ship and crew would not be compromised, decline permission to board, noting that the vessel is proceeding in accordance with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.
- 25.3.10. When combined with evasive manoeuvring, vessels transiting these areas with armed security details onboard have successfully deterred boarding by individuals in approaching small craft. The decision whether to embark a contracted armed security detail and assessment of associated risks is the responsibility of individual companies and vessel Masters, who are responsible for establishing



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use of force guidance and pre-planned responses for vessels carrying contracted armed security details.

25.3.11. If Houthi board a U.S.-flagged commercial vessel without a contracted armed security detail onboard, the crew should not forcibly resist the boarding party. Refraining from forcible resistance does not imply consent or agreement to that boarding.

25.3.12. When operating in these waters, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should maintain a vigilant lookout at all times. If U.S.-flagged commercial vessels observe or hear a suspected UAV or missile or observe a small boat approaching with apparent hostile intent, crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be relocated to a safe space until the threat has passed. Additional precautions should be taken to ensure small boats are kept at a safe distance whenever possible.

25.3.13. In addition to U.S. Maritime Alerts and this Advisory, interim industry transit advice for the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has been established by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). CMF guidance messages are available on the Maritime Global Security website at maritimeglobalsecurity.org/geography/goa-etc/.

25.4. **Iranian Illegal Boarding/Detention/Seizure:** Commercial vessels transiting the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea are at risk of being illegally boarded and detained or seized by Iranian forces. Recent incidents include the April 2023 Iranian seizure of a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel in the Gulf of Oman, the May 2023 Iranian seizure of a Panama-flagged vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, and the January 2024 Iranian seizure of a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel in the Arabian Sea. Iranian forces attempted to seize one Marshall Islands-flagged vessel and one Bahamas-flagged vessel in the Gulf of Oman during July 2023, but were prevented from doing so by U.S. Naval Forces. Iranian forces have utilized small boats and helicopters during boarding operations and have attempted to force commercial vessels into Iranian territorial water

25.4.1. If hailed by Iranian forces, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should provide vessel name and flag state and affirm that they are



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proceeding in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

25.4.2. If Iranian forces seek to board a U.S.-flagged commercial vessel navigating these waters, the ship's Master should, if the safety of the ship and crew would not be compromised, decline permission to board, noting that the vessel is proceeding in accordance with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

25.4.3. If Iranian forces board a U.S.-flagged commercial vessel, the crew should not forcibly resist the boarding party. Refraining from forcible resistance does not imply consent or agreement to that boarding.

25.4.4. It is recommended that vessels in the Persian Gulf remain as far as possible from Iran's territorial sea without compromising navigational safety. When transiting eastbound in the Strait of Hormuz, it is recommended that vessels transit close to Oman's territorial sea.

25.4.5. Industry transit advice for the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman was established on 9 November 2023, and can be found on the Maritime Global Security website at maritimeglobalsecurity.org/geography/goa-etc/.

25.5. **Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:** Recent cases of piracy pose a threat to commercial vessels operating in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Somali Basin, and Northwestern Indian Ocean. Since November 2023, there have been three boarding/hijacking incidents, representing the first such attacks against commercial shipping in the region since March 2017. Pirates may utilize captured fishing vessels as motherships to target vessels operating hundreds of miles from the coast of Somalia. In November 2023, one Liberian-flagged vessel was boarded in the Gulf of Aden; in December 2023, one Malta-flagged vessel was hijacked in the Arabian Sea; and in January 2024, one Liberia-flagged bulk carrier was boarded in the Indian Ocean. Specific case details are available via the Office of Naval Intelligence's weekly "Worldwide Threat to Shipping" product



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at <https://www.oni.navy.mil/ONI-Reports/Shipping-Threat-Reports/Worldwide-Threat-to-Shipping/>.

25.5.1. The Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea (BMP5), and Maritime Global Security website at: <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org> should be consulted prior to operating in the above listed geographic waters.

25.5.2. Transit by yachts and privately owned sailing vessels through the region is hazardous and may result in capture. The U.S. Government advises against all operation of yachts and pleasure craft in these areas. American citizens abroad should inform the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate of their plans to transit the area and/or update their information via the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program at: <https://step.state.gov/step/>. Yachting guidance can be found at: <https://on-shore.mschoa.org/reference-documents/advice-for-sailing-vessels>.

25.5.3. **UAVs:** Outside of the Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden, UAV attacks also pose a threat to commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea. The most recent attacks were on a Malta-flagged vessel in the Arabian Sea in November 2023, and on a Liberian-flagged vessel in the Arabian Sea in December 2023.

- If U.S.-flagged commercial vessels observe or hear a suspected UAV, crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be relocated to a safe space on the vessel until the threat has passed.

25.6. **Limpet Mines:** Limpet mines have been used to damage commercial vessels on multiple occasions in recent years and are primarily a threat to commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. Limpet mines, or similar improvised explosive devices, can be attached to vessel hulls, above or below the waterline, via swimmers or small boats, while a vessel is berthed, at anchor, or underway.



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25.6.1. When operating in these waters, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should maintain a close lookout and remain vigilant for suspicious activity to include the approach of swimmers or small boats. Close attention should be given to the vessel's waterline, especially at slow speeds, at anchor, and when moored.

25.6.2. If a mine has been, or was attempted to have been, attached to a vessel, crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be relocated to a safe space on the vessel until the threat has passed.

25.6.3. Guidance: U.S.-flagged commercial vessels operating in these waters are advised to exercise caution, review security measures, and monitor VHF Channel 16. To afford best protection in the region, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels are also advised to in the event of any attack, incident, or suspicious activity, immediately:

25.6.3.1. Activate the Ship Security Alert System

25.6.3.2. Contact the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch

25.6.3.3. Contact UKMTO

25.6.3.4. Simultaneously register with both the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Office (UKMTO) and the IMSC watch 24 hours prior to entering the Indian Ocean Voluntary Reporting Area by sending UKMTO and IMSC, via a single e-mail, the Initial Report from Annex D of (BMP5). Include the estimated times of arrival at the Suez Canal, Bab el Mandeb Strait (BAM), and Strait of Hormuz (SoH) in line 10 of the report and add line 14 for comments as needed (e.g., speed restrictions or other constraints, anticipated time of entering/exiting the SoH Traffic Separation Scheme; an outline of the navigation plan for operating in the SoH and Persian Gulf, etc.). Utilize other reports included in Annex D of BMP5 as necessary.



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25.6.3.5. Vessels operating in this area are advised to include both NAVCENT NCAGS and the IMSC watch on all updates or incident report emails. By including both as addressees on each email, awareness will be enhanced without creating an additional reporting burden.

25.6.3.6. Conduct a pre-voyage risk assessment and incorporate appropriate protective measures into vessel security plans.

25.6.3.7. The Maritime Global Security website at <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/> offers industry-issued best practices and guidance to mariners by geographic region and provides contact and subscription information for regional maritime security reporting centres, particularly in high-risk areas.

25.6.3.8. Answer all VHF calls from coalition navies. Vessels should be aware that U.S. and other coalition naval forces may conduct maritime awareness calls, queries, and approaches to ensure the safety of vessels transiting these listed waters.

25.6.3.9. Due to the risks of piracy, kidnapping, hijacking, and robbery while operating within U.S. Coast Guard designated High Risk Waters, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels are required to comply with the Guidelines for U.S. Vessels Operating in High-Risk Waters contained in U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security Directive 104-6 (Rev 8) and comply with their Coast Guard approved Vessel Security Plan annex on counter piracy. The U.S. Coast Guard Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance announced in the Federal Register in August 2021 the availability of Revision 8 to Maritime Security (MARSEC) Directive 104-6. U.S. vessel owners and operators who needed to act under previous versions of MARSEC Directive 104-6 should immediately contact their local Coast Guard Captain of the Port or District Commander for a copy of Revision 8.



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25.6.3.10. Per 33 CFR 101.305, report all suspicious activities, breaches of security, and transportation security incident events involving U.S. vessels or persons to the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center. Additional U.S. Coast Guard port specific requirements may be found in Port Security Advisory 1-22 at <https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/InternationalPortSecurity/Port%20Security%20Advisory/PSA%20%201-22%20Remove%20Cote%20d'Ivoire.pdf?ver=6DzYOEswAJQVh7ld4c0ycQ%3d%3d>.

25.7. Contact Information:

- a) Fifth Fleet Battle Watch: cusnc.bwc@me.navy.mil or + 973-1785-3879.
- b) NAVCENT NCAGS:
+973-1785-0033 (Primary/Watch Desk), +973-3940-4523 (Alternate), or m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil.
- c) IMSC: m-ba-imsc-bwc@us.navy.mil or +973-1785-8412/8192/8193.
IMSC organizational information is available at <https://www.imscsentinel.com/>.
- d) UKMTO: watchkeepers@ukmto.org or +44 (0) 2392 222060. UKMTO advisories and warnings are available at <https://www.ukmto.org/>.
- e) U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center: +1-800-424-8802.
- f) USCG NAVCEN: www.navcen.uscg.gov/contact/gps-problem-report or +1-703-313-5900.

26. Maritime Advisory 2022-007-Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom.

26.1. Issued on 6 July 2022. This revised advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2022-001. Issue: Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) serves as a significant threat to U.S.-flagged vessels transiting or



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operating in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) as well as U.S. mariners onboard a vessel or transiting to or from a vessel in the GoG. Guidance: Mariners transiting this area should visit the Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade-Gulf of Guinea MDAT-GoG) website at <https://gog-mdat.org/home> and the NATO Shipping Centre website at <https://shipping.nato.int/nsc/operations/global-maritime-risk/west-africa-gulf-of-guinea> for additional information on threats and specific recommendations for their vessels.

- 26.2. Additionally, the “Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security Off the Coast of West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea” (available under the Geography – Gulf of Guinea pull-down menu at <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/>) provides additional guidance and resources for operating in this area. For any maritime industry questions about this advisory, contact GMCC@uscg.mil.

27. Pirate and maritime crime activities in West African waters are assessed as high-risk due to a recent successful hijacking incident. This past week, there were no reports of piracy or crime at sea.

28. In other parts of the world, there were no reports of piracy or crime at sea during the reported period. UMS HQ has noticed a reduction in criminal activity in Singaporean and Indonesian waters lately. Masters and crew members must, however, remain vigilant. While the criminal activities are primarily confined to petty thefts currently, it would be unthinkable if the perpetrators were to mimic the Nigerian criminals' proven 'business' model by kidnapping a few key crew members and then negotiating for ransoms. The situation could escalate to be worse than the current piracy threats in West Africa or the Indian Ocean if this scenario were to happen.

29. Warning for Red Sea, Bab el-Mandab Straits and Gulf of Aden

- 29.1. There have been numerous attacks and suspicious approaches reported near the southern entrance to the Bab el Mandeb Strait during the reporting period. Levels of pirate activity in the Indian Ocean remain elevated, with five hijacks reported since March 2017 (MT ARIS 13, CASAYR II NO.30, AL KAUSAR, SALAMA 1 and OS 35). The threat of further attacks and hijacking remains high. All Masters are advised to exercise heightened vigilance within the High Risk Area (HRA), stringently implement BMP4 and liaise closely with embarked armed security teams (AST) and regional authorities. If not making calls in Yemen, it's recommended by UKMTO that



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vessels should use the IRTC and western lane of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the Bab el Mandeb / southern Red Sea region, to provide a greater lee from Yemen. Further such incidents and hijackings are likely to take place, and all vessels transiting this region are advised to remain vigilant. While international naval patrols and anti-piracy measures on-board commercial vessels have practically eradicated Somali piracy since its peak in early 2011, poverty coupled with other factors that motivate pirates remain and some vessels transiting this region may have increasingly become complacent in the belief that the piracy threat had diminished.

- 29.2. While the international community has over the past several years taken significant steps in order to improve security in the region, including boosting naval forces in the area and requiring ships to take protection measures, including reporting in and out of high risk areas, sailing at top speed as far away as possible from the Somali coast and travelling with armed escorts on-board, the threat of an attack and hijacking remained as the real root of the cause on the ground in Somalia has never been properly addressed. After five years without a successful attack, analysts say that complacency may have set in and this week's successful hijacking is likely to result in potential copycat attacks, as pirate action groups head-out in a bid to successfully hijack a commercial vessel. Masters are advised to remain vigilant at all times inside the HRA and are advised to adhere to strict guidance and protective measures as set down in BMP5. Sailing yachts should avoid transiting the HRA. Past activity has demonstrated that pirates will attack both large and small yachts transiting this region. While successful attacks and hijackings of merchant vessels have significantly decreased over the past two years, the possibility of attacks and the successful hijacking of sailing vessels continue to remain high. This is due to the reduction of revenue sources from pirated merchant vessels and the fact that sailing yachts are vulnerable and easier targets. PAG's continue to conduct "soft approaches" on merchant ships transiting the area. Skiffs have approached vessels in order to probe the reaction of the crewmembers and any possible Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on-board. If the pirate approach does not elicit a response, the pirates will likely proceed with an attack, in which additional skiffs may participate. Vessels transiting the greater Gulf of Aden region should operate under a heightened state of alert. This is due to increasing tensions in the region, which in turn can escalate the potential for direct or collateral



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damage to vessels transiting the region. These threats may come from a number of different sources such as missiles, projectiles, or waterborne improvised explosive devices. Houthi rebels have claimed responsibility for the 1 October 2016 attack on a UAE vessel.

29.3. UMS HQ advises all vessels transiting this region to report any hostile activities immediately. Somali pirates have recently shown an ability to mount hijacking expeditions far out into the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, and inshore traffic might be an easier target. EUNAVFOR spokesperson Commander Jacqui Sherriff said that the recent series of attacks against commercial shipping again highlights the need for vigilance and adherence to self-protection measures (by the deployment of on-board AST) and compliance to Best Management Practices (BMP) 5. It is crucial that Somali pirates are denied opportunities to attack vessels so that there will no chance of a successful hijack. One successful hijack is one hijack too many because it will encourage and motivate more Somalis to taking up piracy!

29.4. CMF and EUNAVFOR and intelligence agencies have warned of increased complacency amongst stakeholders which may give rise to opportunities for piracy action groups and organizations funding piracy activities to revive the threat.

30. Actions to be Taken when a Vessel with On-Board UMS Maritime Marshals is Approached by a Naval Craft.

30.1. On 16 Dec 23, in the face of increased attacks from pirate action groups and approaches from naval craft, UMS HQ issued the orders on actions to be taken when a naval craft approaches a vessel. These orders were issued to all Team Leaders, and they were further personally briefed by the UMS Operation Officer because of the importance of the subject and the requirement that these orders be fully understood and complied with.

30.2. UMS Maritime Marshals onboard a vessel are to protect the vessel and crew members from pirate action groups. They are equipped with weapons and equipment to handle the threat posed by pirate action groups and **ARE NOT MEANT TO DETER NOR OPPOSE ANY NAVAL CRAFT THAT MAY APPROACH THE VESSEL FOR WHATEVER PURPOSES.** The Orders is repeated in the paragraphs below.



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- 30.3. If a naval craft approaches our vessel, the following actions will be taken.
- 30.3.1. The Team Leader is to alert and discuss the approach of the naval craft with the Master.
 - 30.3.2. The Master must notify the vessel's owner/HQ of the situation.
 - 30.3.3. The team Leader will notify the UMS Operations Officer/UMS HQ.
- 30.4. If the naval craft asks the vessel to stop, the Master will take the appropriate action, as per his discussion with his HQ.
- 30.4.1. Based on the decision to stop, the Team Leader will immediately give orders to his Maritime Marshal(s) to unload and clear their weapons.
 - 30.4.2. **NO WEAPON WILL BE LOADED.**
 - 30.4.3. **UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL ANY MEMBER OF THE MARITIME MARSHAL TEAM SHOW HIS WEAPON TO DETER THE NAVAL CRAFT, FIRE WARNING SHOTS, OR FIRE ANY SHOT AT THE APPROACHING NAVAL VESSEL. THE TEAM LEADER IS TO ENSURE THIS IS CLEARLY BRIEFED AND UNDERSTOOD TO HIS TEAM MEMBERS. THERE MUST BE NO DEVIATION FROM THIS ORDER.**
- 30.5. When the vessel stops as ordered and naval personnel come on board, UMS Maritime Marshals will take the following actions:
- 30.5.1. All Maritime Marshals should keep low on the deck and cover their head with both hands, with their hands visible. They will all be together, lined up side by side.
 - 30.5.2. On no account should any Maritime Marshal make any movement that could be misinterpreted as hostile actions. Their individual weapon should be placed on deck next to the Maritime Marshal, and at no time should any Maritime Marshal handle his weapon.
 - 30.5.3. Do not take any videos or photographs.
 - 30.5.4. All Maritime Marshals should be ready to be questioned on their identity and roles. They will answer the questions truthfully and cooperate fully with the naval personnel on board.



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- 30.5.5. The Team Leader will be the spokesperson of the Maritime Marshal Team, working closely with the Master.
- 30.6. Remember to be cooperative and calm. There is no need to be unduly concerned as the vessel and crew members, including the Maritime Marshal Team, have not committed any wrongdoing.
- 30.7. After the naval personnel depart and the vessel resumes its mission, the Team Leader reconstitutes the Team to continue the mission.
- 30.8. The Team Leader will report the matter to UMS HQ accordingly.

31. Piracy in the Indian Ocean HRA has NOT Been Eradicated

- 31.1. UMS HQ has always maintained this position not to give stakeholders a sense of false security. The current development of piracy raging its ugly head again in the waters off Somalia and in the Indian Ocean is testimony to the accuracy of our analysis.
- 31.2. The decision by world shipping bodies such as BIMCO and the like has given the wrong perception that piracy in the Indian Ocean HRA has been eradicated. **Nothing can be further from the truth!**
- 31.3. Piracy threats have been reduced due to the strong presence and sustained effort by naval forces, namely EUNAVFOR and the US-led Combined Military Force (CMF) and the deployment of armed security teams (AST) onboard commercial vessels. The deployment of ASTs onboard commercial vessels since the peak of the piracy threat in 2008 has proven effective, as no vessel with an AST has ever been hijacked.
- 31.4. Naval and intelligence agencies think pirate syndicates lie low due to the strong deterrence and are involved in other criminal activities, such as drug smuggling. These pirate and criminal syndicates have not been wiped out, and given the correct circumstances and environment, they can get their acts together quickly.
- 31.5. The pirate syndicates are privy to the announcement of the lifting of the HRA. They could view the situation in 2023 as a golden opportunity to resume their proven lucrative 'business'. The current political situation in the Middle East is a significant distraction to the naval forces that will not focus their attention and presence on the more critical military problems with the Iranian-backed Houthis.



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31.6. Given Somalia's poor socio-economic situation, thousands of Somalians will be more than happy to take up arms to hunt and hijack commercial vessels again. The lack of local law enforcement to prevent piracy activities will make this revival a strong possibility. Therefore, the comeback scenario cannot be discounted and is a likely possibility.

31.7. Therefore, from a risk assessment point of view, the risk level in 2024, if deterrence measures are removed, the risk of piracy in 2024 will be objectively higher than in the last 5-6 years.

31.8. **Low piracy threat does not mean NO PIRACY THREAT!**

32. Present Tactics Employed by the Houthis and What We Should Do

32.1. UMS HQ recently studied the profile of attacks against commercial vessels and made the following observations.

32.2. They comprised attacks on commercial vessels by 2-3 skiffs with about 5-9 armed personnel on board (POB). Some vessels have ladders to suggest their intention to board the vessels.

32.3. They approached the commercial vessels, exchanged fires, and then kept a stand-off distance of about 1-2nm.

32.4. In some cases, one or more unmanned surface vessels (USVs) would strike the vessels.

32.5. This is what is happening.

32.5.1. The POB on board the skiffs could be either pirates working with the Houthis or Houthis personnel themselves.

32.5.2. The approach to a vessel is, in military terms, "recce by fire." The objective is to ascertain if the vessel is protected by armed personnel on board because a vessel that is not protected by armed personnel could be easily boarded and hijacked. If they confirmed that the vessel was not protected, they would simply try to board the vessel.



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- 32.5.3. Once they confirmed that the vessel is protected, after exchanging fires they will withdraw if they are just pirates not working with the Houthis.
- 32.5.4. If the POB are pirates working with the Houthis or Houthis personnel themselves, they would withdraw to a stand-off distance of about 1-2nm and continue trailing the vessel. Why?
- 32.5.5. The POB would use their laser designator(s) to guide the USV(s) to engage the commercial vessel. These laser designators have an effective range of about 1-2nm and the further the target is, the less accurate the designation of the USV will be against the target vessel. For this reason, have you noticed that these attacks always happen in daylight hours because the POB does not have night capabilities to designate their lasers at night or in poor visibility?
- 32.6. What must we do?
- 32.6.1. Apply the current SOP when responding to Alert Grey and Alert Red. **The vessel should be transiting at maximum speed.**
- 32.6.2. After the withdrawal of the skiffs and if the skiffs are still trailing the vessel, it suggests that the threat has not disappeared. Be ready to respond to an attack against USV. UMS HQ has issued an SOP on how to destroy an approaching USV. To perfect this drill, UMS maritime marshals should conduct training and rehearsals regularly as part of their anti-piracy drill.
- 32.6.3. **The vessel must continue to transit at maximum speed to make it more difficult for the laser designators to designate our vessel.**
- 32.6.4. After the skiffs' withdrawal, the personnel in the citadel should not remain there as the threat (if any) is different, and they should remain at a location above the vessel's watermark. This presupposes that all Masters have designated this location and



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approved it by their respective Company Chief Security and Safety Office.

33. EU Extends Naval Operation ATALANTA Until 2027 as Somali Piracy Surges in Indian Ocean

- 33.1. In last week's WETA, UMS HQ warned that with the Indian Ocean monsoon season-ending, Somali-based piracy activities could be expected to rise. As this is not bad enough news, the European Council, based on the socio-political and economic situation of Somalia and neighbouring countries, has extended its counter-piracy mission, Operation ATALANTA, for two more years, coming amid a dramatic resurgence of Somali piracy that has seen 43 incidents in the past year.
- 33.2. The renewed mandate to February 2027 strengthens ATALANTA's role in maritime security across the Somalia coast, Gulf of Aden, West Indian Ocean, and parts of the Red Sea. The operation will maintain its focus on combating piracy while expanding efforts to reduce illicit trafficking at sea.
- 33.3. Recent intelligence reports highlight the necessity of the extension. In October 2024, Somali authorities confirmed a group of 13 heavily armed pirates, equipped with AK-47s and RPGs, departed from Ceel Huur Area toward the Somali Basin. Earlier this month, a Chinese fishing vessel allegedly hijacked off Somalia's northeastern Puntland coast.
- 33.4. The pirates' typical strategy involves hijacking dhows to use as mother ships, enabling attacks up to 600 nautical miles off Somalia's eastern coast. The Gulf of Aden's eastern region remains particularly vulnerable.
- 33.5. This year has already seen significant piracy incidents, including the hijacking of two merchant vessels. The *MV Abdullah* was released after a reported \$4 million ransom payment, while the *MV Ruen* required Indian Navy intervention after a three-month captivity.
- 33.6. Experts suggest the situation in the region has been exacerbated by the maritime industry's reduced security measures following the removal of the Indian Ocean High Risk Area designation in January 2023.



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33.7. Operation ATALANTA, established in 2008, has played a crucial role in maritime security, protecting World Food Programme vessels and other vulnerable shipping in the region. The mission's extension comes alongside renewed mandates for EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia, forming part of a comprehensive EU strategy to enhance regional security capabilities.

33.8. With the Indian Ocean monsoon season concluding, maritime security experts anticipate increased piracy activity in the coming months. This development, coupled with ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, presents a complex security challenge for international shipping in the region.

34. Somali Pirates Head Back to Sea

34.1. Shipping has been warned that Somali pirates are back hunting for targets.

34.2. British maritime security consultants Ambrey has issued a notice to clients detailing a suspected pirate action group sighted departing Marreya, Eyl, to the northeast of Somalia.

34.3. Merchant vessels are advised to increase vigilance, and to engage armed security where possible if the vessel has a permissible freeboard.

34.4. The European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA reported that a Yemeni-flagged dhow was taken by pirates on Sunday. The dhow is now likely being used by pirates as a mothership to stage attacks on merchant vessels.

34.5. Piracy was rampant off Somalia for a four-year period from 2008, but then it went dormant for about five years. From March last year, Somali pirates have been back in the headlines, abducting a number of vessels and their crews.

35. UMS CIRCULAR 1-2025 - Actions to be Taken when a Vessel with On-Board UMS Maritime Marshals is Approached by Houthis/Yemini Navy



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- 35.1. On 10 Jul 25, UMS HQ issued the abovementioned Circular 1-2025. This circular is to address the prevailing threat faced by commercial shipping from the Houthis/Yemeni Navy.
- 35.2. In this Circular, UMS HQ makes it clear that our clients' vessels are not the target of the Houthis/Yemeni Navy and that our Masters, crew members, Team Leaders and Maritime Marshals should not have any fear regarding this threat but they must know how to respond if and when confronted with the situation. ***All Masters and Team Leaders are to note that the presence of the on-board AST is to deter and prevent any boarding by pirates. The ASTs are not to be involved in any fight with the Houthis/Yemeni Navy or Iranian Navy that may threaten the safety of their vessels and all crew members onboard.***
- 35.3. There is a need for Masters and Team Leaders to know how to differentiate between an approach by the Houthis/Yemeni Navy and pirates so that they will learn how to respond appropriately and correctly.
- 35.4. Due to the importance of this subject, UMS HQ will be conducting a personal briefing to all Team Leaders on this subject. The contents of the said Circular is repeated in this WETA No. 715 to reinforce the importance of the subject. See the attached Annexe A to this WETA, which is to be read in conjunction with an earlier UMS Circular in paragraph 29

36. International Maritime Bureau Reports Increase in Piracy and Maritime Crime

- 36.1. The ICC International Maritime Bureau, an international reporting centre for piracy and maritime crimes, analysed reporting for 2025, highlighting an increase in global maritime incidents. It warns of an increase in piracy and armed robbery, and while much of it was low-level crime, the group emphasised the need for timely reporting to counter the spike.
- 36.2. Overall, during 2025, the group received information on 137 incidents against ships, up from 116 in 2024 and 120 in 2023. The reports break down as follows: 121 vessels boarded, 4 hijacked, 2 fired upon, and a further 10 failed attempts.



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36.3. Another concern is the rise in the number of incidents in which the perpetrators were armed. IMB reports there were 42 incidents in which the boarders were carrying guns compared with 26 in the prior year. The use of knives, however, declined slightly with 33 incidents in 2025 versus 39 in 2024.

36.4. While most reported incidents in 2025 were categorised as low-level, violence against crew continues, with 46 crew members taken hostage in 2025 compared to 126 in 2024 and 73 in 2023. Twenty-five crewmembers were reported kidnapped, compared to 12 in 2024 and 14 in 2023. A further 10 crewmembers were threatened, four were injured, and three were assaulted in 2025.

36.5. The report highlights that the greatest number of incidents are with vessels that are underway (88 of the reported boardings in 2025). A vessel that was steaming was three times more likely (27) to be boarded than a ship at anchor. Also, bulkers remain the most vulnerable type (50), with containerships and product tankers each at approximately 20 incidents.

36.6. Geographically, Southeast Asia is the area of greatest concern, accounting for 95 of the incidents reported last year. As reported throughout the year and by the regional ReCAAP operation, the Singapore Strait accounted for nearly all the incidents. A total of 75 vessels were boarded in 2025, with five additional attempts, according to reports filed with IMB. There were 11 reports of incidents in Indonesia, the second-highest area in Southeast Asia.

36.7. More than half of the global incidents in 2025 happened in the Singapore Straits. They noted a disproportionate increase in the use of guys (27 in 2025 versus just 8 in 2024). IMB also highlights that 14 crewmembers were taken hostage in the Singapore Straits, while eight were threatened, three were injured, and one was assaulted. However, most crime in the Singapore Strait region is low-level, with perpetrators attempting to steal equipment or spare parts and fleeing when discovered.

36.8. Both IMB and ReCAAP also highlighted a significant decline in the number of incidents in the region around the Singapore Straits and



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Indonesia in the second half of 2025. They credit the apprehension of two gangs in July 2025 by the Indonesian Marine Police with helping to reduce the crime spree in the region.

36.9. It also notes the success of the continuing efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, primarily by local authorities. The number of incidents remained stable at 21 in 2025, compared with 18 in 2024 and 22 in 2023.

36.10 While there was also a highly publicised re-emergence of incidents off Somalia, IMB highlights that the lack of a broader resurgence was due to the continuing deterrents of the naval presence in the region and vessels being on alert and hardening their defences. Two of the incidents it notes were far from shore, showing that Somali pirate groups can still interfere with shipping. IMB highlights that 26 crewmembers were taken hostage off Somalia and Africa overall accounted for nearly all the hijackings, primarily off the West coast of the continent.

36.11. IMB also expressed concern about the late reporting of incidents. Quick reporting helps the authorities, and it also helps to protect other vessels in the area.

37 Pirates Kidnap Chinese Crewmembers from Fishing Vessel off Gabon

37.11. On Monday, 12 January 26, armed pirates boarded a trawler off the coast of Gabon and kidnapped multiple foreign crewmembers, according to the Gabonese Ministry of Defence.

37.12. At about 0200 hours local time, the Gabonese-flagged fishing vessel *IB Fish 7* was underway and engaged in fishing about seven nautical miles off Ekwata, Gabon. Three armed pirates approached and boarded, and they kidnapped nine crewmembers, reports maritime security consultancy Vanguard Tech.

37.13. The abductees included five Chinese nationals and four Indonesians. The remaining six crewmembers - all Indonesian, Chinese and Burkina Faso nationals - were left behind on board.



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37.14. Upon learning of the attack, the Gabonese authorities launched a response, with assistance from the French Navy. The responders escorted *IB Fish 7* back to port in Libreville, Gabon, without further incident. *IB Fish 7* does not appear in international shipping databases. AIS signals for vessels named *IB Fish 1, 2* and *3* have been received by some (but not all) marine traffic tracking platforms.

37.15. *IB Fish* is a division of Burkina Faso company EBOMAF, a growing conglomerate with interests throughout West Africa. The firm recently built a tuna processing plant in Gabon to localise production of higher-value goods.

38. As Suez Traffic Cautiously Returns, Houthis Make New Threats

38.11. Shipping lines have been exploring a reopening of their container line services through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

38.12. CMA CGM has led the way. After having maintained some transits using naval protection during the conflict with the Houthis, the French carrier has returned two regular container line services starting this month. It follows the passage through the Red Sea by their French-flagged *CMA CGM Jacques Saade* and Marshall Island-flagged *CMA CGM Adonis*, both of whom have both made transits since Christmas without incident.

38.13. Danish shipping company Maersk has also been exploring a reopening, having sent the US-flagged containership *Maersk Denver* north through the Bab el Mandab Strait into the Red Sea on January 12, which followed a transit earlier in December by Singapore-flagged *Maersk Sebarok*. Maersk announced on January 15 that it is restoring its first route, one between the U.S. and India to sail through the Suez – Red Sea corridor. It said it would continue to closely monitor security in the region.

38.14. Although the last incident was on September 29, when the Dutch-flagged general cargo vessel *MV Minervagracht* fell victim to a Houthi attack, traffic through the Suez Canal has not yet recovered. Suez Canal traffic transits in 4Q25 were 19 percent lower than in 2023



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and 45 percent lower than in 2024, figures skewed by an increase in product tanker transits, while container traffic has still not recovered.

38.15. This caution may be justified.

38.16. On January 15, Houthi leader Abdel Malek Al Houthi made new threats on Al Mayadeen television. He warned that reconnaissance was being conducted preparatory to the launching of attacks on what he described both as Israeli and Zionist fixed positions in Somaliland. He called the positions a threat to Houthi oversight of the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb Straits.

38.17. The Houthis previously have never been very precise in their targeting threats, making very broad or perhaps imprecise interpretations of what constitutes an Israeli or Zionist target. It must be assumed, therefore, that Emirati and U.S.-operated sites are also vulnerable, and that such sites anywhere in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden littoral are also covered by this Houthi threat.

38.18. It is unclear what sites, presumably for intelligence collection purposes, are maintained by the Israelis in Somaliland, although rumours have persisted for some time that such sites exist. Hilltop intercept and radar sites need not have a large footprint and, indeed, could largely be unmanned, using satellite links to rebroadcast intercepts to safe locations for analysis. The Somaliland government, newly recognised by Israel, has already indicated its continuing support for military ties with Israel.

38.19. Similar sites may also have been supported by the Emirati presence on islands and coastal areas in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, although their presence has never been reliably established. The Yemeni Internationally Recognized Government (IRG), with much enhanced support from the Saudis, appears to have taken over the coastline south of Hodeida, with the Emiratis having left their recently-constructed airfields at Mocha and Dhubab. Based on a rush of heavy-lift cargo air movements, the Emiratis appear also to have left the Red Sea islands of Perim and Zuqar. The Emiratis still, however, have a foothold in Assab on Eritrea's Red Sea coast. The UAE is also maintaining its military footprint at Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland on the south side of the Gulf of Aden, with the



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support of the autonomous governments of these areas and despite falling out with the Somali government.

38.20. The UAE has, for the moment, retained some form of presence on the island of Socotra. But Emirati companies, such as Prime Fishing, which used to wholesale the local fishing industry, have closed shop, as have hospitals, ADNOC selling fuel, and Eastern Triangle generating electricity. Socotrans serving in the UAE-sponsored local militia have been paid off. Social media has shown a Saudi force boarding ships in Mukalla en route to consolidate the IRG's hold on Socotra. If, as is likely, there were intelligence collection sites in the Socotra Archipelago overlooking the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC), and they served a useful anti-Houthi purpose, it is possible that the IRG would wish to support their continued operation, notwithstanding a full Emirati withdrawal.

38.21. The geopolitical situation for the Houthis has also changed. While the Houthi leadership has declared its continuing support for the Iranian religious leadership, and is Iran's last remaining reliable ally, Houthi ranks have been severely depleted by the targeted attacks on its leadership cadre last summer. Confidence (and bravado) has taken a knock, and the Houthis may be keen not to broaden any reactivation of hostilities, particularly with the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group making its way to the region. But they remain an enduring threat to the maritime community.

39. The Gradual Return of Ships to the Red Sea Hits a Key Milestone

39.11. After more than two years of avoiding the Red Sea, the world's leading container lines are inching back to the vital lane for east-west trade and indicating it looks safe to navigate again.

39.12. A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S on Thursday said it's redirecting a regular service through the Suez Canal, a sign the No. 2 carrier is growing confident that the risks of attacks tied to conflict in the region are diminished. The trip previously went around southern Africa because Yemen-based Houthis attacked passing ships to protest Israel's war in Gaza.



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39.13. It seems to be an indication that we might begin to see a wider normalisation after Chinese New Year,” Vespucci Maritime Chief Executive Officer Lars Jensen said, referring to a holiday that lands this year in the second half of February. “The other carriers will take note and likely begin to plan for their own return.”

39.14. While shorter distances help global trade run smoother, they effectively boost maritime transportation capacity because vessels need less time to make their deliveries — potentially weighing on spot container rates and shipping companies’ revenue. Upwards of \$2 trillion in commerce passed through the area on ships in 2023, according to data from Clarkson Research Services Ltd.

39.15. A Maersk service linking India and the United Arab Emirates with the US East and Gulf Coasts will undergo a “structural change,” according to an advisory. That shift started with a westbound vessel that left Jebel Ali port in Dubai on Thursday. The first ship on the eastward leg through Suez departed Savannah, Georgia, earlier this week.

39.16. Maersk called it a “significant milestone,” while adding that there’s a contingency plan “should the security situation deteriorate” and sailing around the Cape of Good Hope is necessary to ensure crew safety.

39.17. The Copenhagen-based company’s green light for an entire loop follows two individual runs and similar moves by competitors. Five ships operated by MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co. SA and Marseille, France-based CMA CGM SA recently transited Suez, according to Drewry Shipping Consultants.

39.18. MSC, based in Geneva, is the top carrier and CMA CGM ranks third. Spokesmen for both closely held carriers didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment. Combined, the top three account for about 48% of global capacity, according to an Alphaliner tally.

39.19. ‘Turning Point’



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39.19.1. “Maersk has generally been the most risk-averse out the major carriers regarding a return to the Red Sea, so this is a turning point,” said Peter Sand, chief analyst with Xeneta, a digital freight platform in Oslo. “The services announced by Maersk as returning to the Suez Canal are smaller ships operating outside an alliance, but the fact it is Maersk making this move is highly significant.”

39.19.2. In the week ended Sunday, a five-week high of 26 container ships crossed the Egyptian shipping channel, up from 10 the previous week but still well below the weekly average of about 80 vessels before the diversions started in late 2023, according a research note from Drewry.

39.19.3. Analysts caution that revising all schedules back to normal will likely take the global container fleet several months to complete and hinge on the security situation staying stable.

39.19.4. “This marks a step in the right direction, but a full return might not be imminent,” said Jorgen Lian, an equity research analyst with DNB Carnegie. “It all comes down to how this works out because it still, of course, remains contingent on no new hostilities.”

39.20. Five Months

39.20.1. Sand estimated it could take three to five months for Suez schedules to be fully reinstated.

39.20.2. The shipping lines have indicated they’ll make the transition gradually to avoid port congestion caused by revised schedules, and to prevent excess capacity from sending spot rates plunging to unprofitable levels. They also don’t want to undermine reliability by changing course, only to alter it again if the security situation worsens.



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39.20.3. On top of the supply pressures, the demand picture is softening for carriers because global goods trade is expected to slacken this year after a solid year in 2025. Oxford Economics on Thursday forecast world goods trade will grow 1.7% this year, a sharp slowdown from 4.9% in 2025.

39.20.4. Freight rates “were already under strain from challenging supply-demand dynamics, and they might move even lower,” Bloomberg Intelligence transportation analysts wrote in a research note.

39.20.5. The diversions away from the Red Sea, which absorbed about 7% of global container capacity, have underpinned shipping rates and bolstered carrier earnings for the past two years.

39.21. Maersk shares fell more than 5% on Thursday, while Hamburg, Germany-based Hapag-Lloyd AG — Maersk’s partner in the Gemini vessel-sharing alliance — dropped more than 3%. Both were down again on Friday.

39.22. “The capacity impact is modest, but the signal is meaningful,” Clarksons Securities analysts including Frode Morkedal wrote in reference to Maersk’s latest announcement. Still, an underlying risk remains given the potential for shifts in Iran’s policies around the Strait of Hormuz, they added.

40. West Africa

40.11. Unlike the presence and substantial involvement of international navies, numbering more than 43 countries and the legit deployment of armed security teams (AST) onboard commercial vessels transiting the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA, the situation in the West Africa HRA is about just the opposite. Nigerian government laws and regulations prohibit the deployment of ASTs other than those brokered by local security companies that use Navy personnel, which the government has declared are not supported by



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it. Besides the Nigerian Navy, no other naval forces provide security or deterrence against the pirates operated by criminal syndicates based in Nigeria.

40.12. In other words, the waters and ports around Nigeria are almost a perfect hunting ground for the local criminal syndicates. Given this situation, the threat of piracy at this point is higher and more dangerous than that posed by Somali pirates in the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA, although, depending on the continued presence of the navies of EUNAVFOR and CMF and the other independent naval forces and the continued use of on-board ASTs, the situation may quickly reverse. Somali pirates still have the intent, skills, and resources to attack merchant ships. Fundamentally, naval forces and intelligence agencies have repeatedly called for continued vigilance and preparedness in the fight against piracy in both the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA and the West Africa HRA. Ignoring these warnings places one's business, vessels, and crew members at risk!

40.13. Intelligence agencies noted that Nigeria's pirate action groups (PAGs) have been relatively quiet in the last 2-3 months. However, this does not suggest that the piracy threat in West Africa has been eradicated. PAGs may strike at any time, and the only protection and solution is to be well prepared for such an eventuality.

41. UMS HQ advises all stakeholders never to take the security and safety of their vessels and crew members for granted. **CURRENT LOW PIRACY THREAT doesn't mean NO PIRACY THREAT!**

42. Remember Always "Be Vigilant, Be Safe and Never Be Sorry!"

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