



Universal Maritime Solutions Pte Ltd
No. 21 Bukit Batok Crescent, WCEGA Tower, #28-70, Singapore 658065

WEEKLY THREAT ADVISORY NO. 704

(10 - 16 April 2025)

Summary of Threat Activities and Conclusion

- 1.** Pirate and maritime crime activity in East Africa and the Indian Ocean HRA saw an increase in the number of piracy activities in the HRA. US Naval Intelligence has issued warnings which were featured in WETA No. 696. There was one reported attack of a commercial vessel this past week. Despite this seemingly small number, the threat level remains high given the political volatility and tension in the region which, criminal and pirate syndicates will exploit.
- 2.** GULF OF ADEN. On 15 April, multiple boats with armed personal onboard approached a Palau-flagged bulk carrier while underway approximately 100nm east of Aden, Yemen. Intelligence reported that when the perpetrators were aware that the vessel was protected by an armed security team (AST), they retreated. This incident suggests the significance of having an onboard AST for the safety and well-being of the vessel and crew.
- 3.** Based on the geographical development, the general forecast is that the piracy situation will persist even though the conflict between Israel, the Hamas, the Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iran and other Arab factions seems to stabilise. The new political problem brewing in Syria may be another flash point to spark a new conflict among the warring factions. In the meantime, pirate and criminal syndicates operating in Somalia will exploit the turmoil and chaos to conduct opportunistic attacks against defenceless commercial shipping. UMS HQ warns all stakeholders, that the maritime industry should brace for increased pirate activity as the post-monsoon season brings calmer seas. In WETA No. 689, UMS HQ issued an Annex for instructions on enhanced measures during this period.
- 4.** **U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-007: Global - U.S. Maritime Advisory Updates, Resources, and Contacts. Issued on 9 April 2025.** This advisory provides updates to maritime security resources, websites, and information. The U.S. Maritime Advisory System website: <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/> which contains all current and expired U.S. Maritime Alerts and Advisories, is maintained by the Maritime Administration (MARAD). U.S. commercial maritime stakeholders'



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feedback should be forwarded to MARADSecurity@dot.gov. This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-13 and will automatically expire on 6 October 2025.

5. **U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-006: Worldwide - Foreign Adversarial Technological, Physical and Cyber Influence.** Issued on 9 April 2025. This advisory seeks to alert maritime stakeholders of potential vulnerabilities to maritime port equipment, networks, operating systems, software, and infrastructure. Foreign companies manufacture, install, and maintain port equipment that create vulnerabilities to global maritime infrastructure information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. The U.S. Government in the past few years has published several documents illuminating the risks associated with integrating and utilizing China's state-supported National Public Information Platform for Transportation and Logistics (LOGINK), Nuctech scanners, and automated ship-to-shore cranes worldwide. For more information about U.S. Maritime Alerts and Advisories, please visit <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/>. This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-011 and will automatically expire on 6 October 2025.

6. **U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-005: Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Somali Basin - Houthi Attacks on Commercial Vessels.** Issued on 28 March 2025. This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-001. On 15 March, U.S. forces commenced strikes against targets used by Houthi terrorists in Yemen to launch attacks against commercial and military vessels operating within international shipping lanes. Houthi forces have subsequently threatened to strike U.S. assets, including commercial vessels, and are at high risk until further notice. For maritime industry questions about this advisory, contact the Global Maritime Operational Threat Response Coordination Center at GMCC@uscg.mil. Supplemental information about U.S. Maritime Alerts and Advisories, including subscription details, may be found at: <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci>. This message will automatically expire on 24 September 2025.

7. **US Naval Intelligence has issued a new advisory. U.S. Maritime Advisory (2025-004: Black Sea and Sea of Azov - Military Combat Operations)** Issued on 5 March 2025. This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-012. Since February 2022, projectiles have reportedly struck commercial vessels and experienced explosions in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. There have also been reports of moored and drifting naval mines. While some past actions may have targeted specific commercial vessels due to their association with certain countries or their activity, the potential remains for miscalculation or misidentification, resulting in a high



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risk of damage to commercial vessels in the region. For more information about U.S. Maritime Alerts and Advisories, including subscription details, please visit <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci>. This advisory will automatically expire on 1 September 2025.

8. US Naval Intelligence has issued three advisories, and all stakeholders, including Masters, crew members, Team Leaders, and maritime marshals, are to heed these warnings.
9. **Three U.S. Maritime Advisories (2025-001, 2025-002, and 2025-003) were issued on 14 February 2025.** These advisories clarify specific threats faced in the Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Strait of Hormuz, and Indian Ocean. For maritime industry questions on these advisories, contact the Global Maritime Operational Threat Response Coordination Center at GMCC@uscg.mil. Supplemental information about U.S. Maritime Alerts and Advisories, including subscription details, may be found at <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci>. These advisories will automatically expire on 11 August 2025.
10. **U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-001: Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden - Houthi Attacks on Commercial Vessels.** This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-008. On 19 January 2025, Houthi officials in Yemen claimed that they were ceasing their attacks on U.S.- and U.K.- flagged, owned, and affiliated commercial vessels; commercial vessels partially owned or managed by Israeli individuals or entities; and commercial vessels bound for Israeli ports. Due to current uncertainty regarding these Houthi announcements, commercial vessels remain at risk from terrorism and other hostile actions from the Houthis when transiting this region until further notice.
11. **U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-002: Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman - Iranian Illegal Boarding / Detention / Seizure.** This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-009. Although there is no specific threat to U.S.-flagged vessels, commercial vessels transiting this region may be at risk of being illegally boarded and detained or seized by Iranian forces. Iranian forces have utilized small boats and helicopters during boarding operations and have attempted to force commercial vessels into Iranian territorial waters.



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- 12. U.S. Maritime Advisory 2025-003: Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean - Piracy/Armed Robbery / Kidnapping for Ransom.** This advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2024-010. Recent cases of piracy pose a general threat to all commercial vessels operating in this region. Since November 2023, there have been seven reported boarding/hijacking incidents. Pirates have utilized captured fishing vessels as motherships. Successful or attempted boardings and suspicious approaches have been reported up to 960 NM off the coast of Somalia. Specific case details are available at <https://www.oni.navy.mil/ONI-Reports/Shipping-Threat-Reports/Worldwide-Threat-to-Shipping/>.

- 13.** There have been some calls by some ignorant commercial bodies that do not understand the threat deeply and well enough to call for the removal of AST onboard commercial vessels due to concerns that the onboard AST might cause an incident with approaching naval craft. While the concerns are reasonable, the proposed solution to remove the onboard AST is highly unprofessional and dangerous. Implementing it would make the commercial vessels concerned 'sitting ducks' in the face of attacks by Somali pirates who take advantage of the chaos and distractions caused by the conflict. Some intelligence sources have established that some pirate action groups are working in cahoot with the Houthis. Therefore, we should see the increased attacks by Somali pirates linked with the Houthis activities in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. For this reason, UMS HQ instructed how UMS Maritime Marshals will respond and behave when confronted with this situation.

- 14.** All vessels in the vicinity are, therefore, to exercise caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO.

- 15.** In the latest quarterly report by UKMTO, it was reported that there has been an increased incidence of suspicious sightings compared to a year ago before the lifting off of the HRA by commercial shipping bodies. Intelligence agencies have unanimously agreed that there would be attempts by pirates' syndicates to exploit hopefully a relaxed attitude by the shipping community, and today we are seeing the manifestation of the situation happening. In other words, the possibility of a successful hijack can only be prevented if vessels have on-board armed security teams (AST) to deter and if necessary, prevent any attack and boarding by pirates.



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- 16.** The main message of the Quarterly Reporting by UKMTO is that piracy has been suppressed but not eradicated. So long as the socio-politico-economic problems of Somalia and Yemen are unresolved, the threat of piracy against commercial shipping will remain.
- 17.** All Masters and UMS Maritime are advised to remain vigilant. The increased piracy-related activities in the waters of the Indian Ocean and East Africa/Red Sea have, in fact, been anticipated by intelligence agencies by the removal of the HRA by world commercial bodies but not by the War Committee, which assessed that the present situation has inadvertently increased the threat level.
- 18.** UKMTO and other intelligence agencies have noticed increased activities by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). This recent development brings a new equation and range of challenges to the safety of commercial vessels transiting in waters that are prone to pirates' attacks in the Northern Indian Ocean and Southern Red Sae and maritime security operations. UMS HQ repeats the article on the subject in paragraph 31 given its importance in understanding the capabilities of UAV in maritime security operations (in particular paragraph 31.6) for a detailed exposition.
- 19. 2024-001-Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden, Northwestern Indian Ocean, Somali Basin, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz, and Persian Gulf-Threats to Commercial Vessels**

 - 19.1. This advisory replaces and cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2023-011 and U.S. Maritime Alert 2024-001B
 - 19.2. Issue: Regional conflict, military activity, and piracy pose significant threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas as evidenced by recent Houthi attacks and Somali piracy activity. The U.S. government is continually assessing the maritime security situation in the region to safeguard freedom of navigation, ensure the free flow of commerce, and protect U.S. vessels, personnel, and interests. The recent standup of Operation Prosperity Guardian is one of many examples of U.S. and international cooperative maritime security operations within this region. The following are currently deemed to be the most pressing threats to U.S.-flagged and U.S.-affiliated commercial vessels throughout this region.



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19.3. **Houthi Hostile Actions:** Commercial vessels transiting the Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden are at an elevated risk of hostile actions from the Houthis. Hostile actions include one-way Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks; ballistic and cruise missile attacks; small arms fire from small boats; explosive boat attacks; and illegal boardings, detentions, and/or seizures. There have been at least 30 separate Houthi attacks on commercial vessels and one Houthi seizure of a commercial vessel in these areas, affecting over 55 nations since November 19, 2023. In November 2023, the Houthis conducted a helicopter-borne landing and seizure of a Bahamas-flagged commercial vessel in the Southern Red Sea. Entities claiming to be Yemeni authorities have also attempted to direct commercial vessels in the Southern Red Sea to divert to Yemen. These threats pose both direct and collateral risks to U.S.-flagged and U.S.-affiliated commercial vessels transiting in international shipping lanes, or otherwise operating in these areas.

19.3.1. U.S.-flagged commercial vessels operating in these areas are advised to remain as far as possible from Yemen's territorial sea without compromising navigational safety. Crewmembers should be especially vigilant when at anchor, operating in restricted maneuvering conditions, or proceeding at slow speeds.

19.3.2. Coordinate voyage planning with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) and consider their recommendations and guidance whenever possible. NAVCENT NCAGS stands a 24-hour watch and has the latest information on the current maritime security threats and the operational environment in this region.

19.3.3. The route taken through these areas, and timing of the transit, remains at the discretion of individual companies and vessel Masters. Transiting these areas during hours of darkness may frustrate efforts to target vessels.

19.3.4. Adherence to all U.S. and international requirements and guidance regarding operation of AIS remains the responsibility of individual companies and vessel Masters. Ships operating with AIS



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switched on and off have both been the object of Houthi attacks. Switching AIS off makes it marginally more difficult to track or target a ship but may also hinder the ability of coalition forces to provide support.

19.3.5. U.S.-flagged commercial vessels are advised to provide hourly positional email updates to the NAVCENT NCAGS detachment when transiting these areas.

19.3.6. Maritime operators are advised to alert their crews to the fact that all electronics signals from their vessels pose a risk to maritime operations.

19.3.7. A missile strike on a Marshall Islands-flagged commercial tanker in the Gulf of Aden on January 26, 2024 resulted in a significant onboard fire. U.S.-flagged commercial vessels carrying flammable, explosive, or otherwise hazardous cargoes are strongly advised to reconsider transit through these areas. However, if planning voyages through these areas, vessels should take all prudent safety precautions, including thoroughly preparing for emergency responses, and considering carriage of additional safety and damage control preparedness supplies and equipment, such as those needed to extinguish fires.

19.3.8. If hailed on VHF by the Houthis, or entities claiming to be Yemeni authorities, and instructed to alter course to Al Hudaydah or another location on the northwest coast of Yemen, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should ignore the VHF call and continue their passage if safe to do so.

19.3.9. If the Houthis seek to board U.S.-flagged commercial vessels in these areas, the ship's Master should, if the safety of the ship and crew would not be compromised, decline permission to board, noting that the vessel is proceeding in accordance with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

19.3.10. When combined with evasive maneuvering, vessels transiting these areas with armed security details onboard have successfully



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deterred boarding by individuals in approaching small craft. The decision whether to embark a contracted armed security detail and assessment of associated risks is the responsibility of individual companies and vessel Masters, who are responsible for establishing use of force guidance and pre-planned responses for vessels carrying contracted armed security details.

19.3.11. If Houthis board a U.S.-flagged commercial vessel without a contracted armed security detail onboard, the crew should not forcibly resist the boarding party. Refraining from forcible resistance does not imply consent or agreement to that boarding.

19.3.12. When operating in these waters, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should maintain a vigilant lookout at all times. If U.S.-flagged commercial vessels observe or hear a suspected UAV or missile or observe a small boat approaching with apparent hostile intent, crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be relocated to a safe space until the threat has passed. Additional precautions should be taken to ensure small boats are kept at a safe distance whenever possible.

19.3.13. In addition to U.S. Maritime Alerts and this Advisory, interim industry transit advice for the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has been established by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). CMF guidance messages are available on the Maritime Global Security website at maritimeglobalsecurity.org/geography/goa-etc/.

19.4. **Iranian Illegal Boarding/Detention/Seizure:** Commercial vessels transiting the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea are at risk of being illegally boarded and detained or seized by Iranian forces. Recent incidents include the April 2023 Iranian seizure of a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel in the Gulf of Oman, the May 2023 Iranian seizure of a Panama-flagged vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, and the January 2024 Iranian seizure of a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel in the Arabian Sea. Iranian forces attempted to seize one Marshall Islands-flagged vessel and one Bahamas-flagged vessel in the Gulf of Oman during July 2023, but were prevented from doing so by U.S. Naval Forces. Iranian forces have utilized small boats



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and helicopters during boarding operations and have attempted to force commercial vessels into Iranian territorial water

19.4.1. If hailed by Iranian forces, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should provide vessel name and flag state and affirm that they are proceeding in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

19.4.2. If Iranian forces seek to board a U.S.-flagged commercial vessel navigating these waters, the ship's Master should, if the safety of the ship and crew would not be compromised, decline permission to board, noting that the vessel is proceeding in accordance with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

19.4.3. If Iranian forces board a U.S.-flagged commercial vessel, the crew should not forcibly resist the boarding party. Refraining from forcible resistance does not imply consent or agreement to that boarding.

19.4.4. It is recommended that vessels in the Persian Gulf remain as far as possible from Iran's territorial sea without compromising navigational safety. When transiting eastbound in the Strait of Hormuz, it is recommended that vessels transit close to Oman's territorial sea.

19.4.5. Industry transit advice for the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman was established on 9 November 2023, and can be found on the Maritime Global Security website at maritimeglobalsecurity.org/geography/goa-etc/.

19.5. **Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:** Recent cases of piracy pose a threat to commercial vessels operating in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Somali Basin, and Northwestern Indian Ocean. Since November 2023, there have been three boarding/hijacking incidents, representing the first such attacks against commercial shipping in the region since March 2017. Pirates may utilize captured fishing vessels as motherships to target vessels operating hundreds of miles from the coast of Somalia. In November 2023, one Liberian-flagged vessel was boarded in the Gulf of Aden; in December



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2023, one Malta-flagged vessel was hijacked in the Arabian Sea; and in January 2024, one Liberia-flagged bulk carrier was boarded in the Indian Ocean. Specific case details are available via the Office of Naval Intelligence's weekly "Worldwide Threat to Shipping" product at <https://www.oni.navy.mil/ONI-Reports/Shipping-Threat-Reports/Worldwide-Threat-to-Shipping/>.

19.5.1. The Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea (BMP5), and Maritime Global Security website at: <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org> should be consulted prior to operating in the above listed geographic waters.

19.5.2. Transit by yachts and privately owned sailing vessels through the region is hazardous and may result in capture. The U.S. Government advises against all operation of yachts and pleasure craft in these areas. American citizens abroad should inform the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate of their plans to transit the area and/or update their information via the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program at: <https://step.state.gov/step/>. Yachting guidance can be found at: <https://on-shore.mschoa.org/reference-documents/advice-for-sailing-vessels>.

19.5.3. **UAVs:** Outside of the Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden, UAV attacks also pose a threat to commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea. The most recent attacks were on a Malta-flagged vessel in the Arabian Sea in November 2023, and on a Liberian-flagged vessel in the Arabian Sea in December 2023.

- If U.S.-flagged commercial vessels observe or hear a suspected UAV, crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be relocated to a safe space on the vessel until the threat has passed.

19.6. **Limpet Mines:** Limpet mines have been used to damage commercial vessels on multiple occasions in recent years and are primarily a threat to commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of



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Oman. Limpet mines, or similar improvised explosive devices, can be attached to vessel hulls, above or below the waterline, via swimmers or small boats, while a vessel is berthed, at anchor, or underway.

19.6.1. When operating in these waters, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should maintain a close lookout and remain vigilant for suspicious activity to include the approach of swimmers or small boats. Close attention should be given to the vessel's waterline, especially at slow speeds, at anchor, and when moored.

19.6.2. If a mine has been, or was attempted to have been, attached to a vessel, crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be relocated to a safe space on the vessel until the threat has passed.

19.6.3. Guidance: U.S.-flagged commercial vessels operating in these waters are advised to exercise caution, review security measures, and monitor VHF Channel 16. To afford best protection in the region, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels are also advised to in the event of any attack, incident, or suspicious activity, immediately:

19.6.3.1. Activate the Ship Security Alert System

19.6.3.2. Contact the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch

19.6.3.3. Contact UKMTO

19.6.3.4. Simultaneously register with both the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Office (UKMTO) and the IMSC watch 24 hours prior to entering the Indian Ocean Voluntary Reporting Area by sending UKMTO and IMSC, via a single e-mail, the Initial Report from Annex D of (BMP5). Include the estimated times of arrival at the Suez Canal, Bab el Mandeb Strait (BAM), and Strait of Hormuz (SoH) in line 10 of the report and add line 14 for comments as needed (e.g., speed restrictions or other constraints, anticipated time of entering/exiting the SoH Traffic Separation Scheme; an outline of the navigation plan for operating in the SoH and



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Persian Gulf, etc.). Utilize other reports included in Annex D of BMP5 as necessary.

19.6.3.5. Vessels operating in this area are advised to include both NAVCENT NCAGS and the IMSC watch on all updates or incident report emails. By including both as addressees on each email, awareness will be enhanced without creating an additional reporting burden.

19.6.3.6. Conduct a pre-voyage risk assessment and incorporate appropriate protective measures into vessel security plans.

19.6.3.7. The Maritime Global Security website at <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/> offers industry issued best practices and guidance to mariners by geographic region and provides contact and subscription information for regional maritime security reporting centers, particularly in high risk-areas.

19.6.3.8. Answer all VHF calls from coalition navies. Vessels should be aware that U.S. and other coalition naval forces may conduct maritime awareness calls, queries, and approaches to ensure the safety of vessels transiting these listed waters.

19.6.3.9. Due to the risks of piracy, kidnapping, hijacking, and robbery while operating within U.S. Coast Guard designated High Risk Waters, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels are required to comply with the Guidelines for U.S. Vessels Operating in High-Risk Waters contained in U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security Directive 104-6 (Rev 8) and comply with their Coast Guard approved Vessel Security Plan annex on counter piracy. The U.S. Coast Guard Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance announced in the Federal Register in August 2021 the availability of Revision 8 to Maritime Security (MARSEC) Directive 104-6. U.S. vessel owners and operators who needed to act under previous versions of MARSEC Directive 104-6 should immediately



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contact their local Coast Guard Captain of the Port or District Commander for a copy of Revision 8.

19.6.3.10. Per 33 CFR 101.305, report all suspicious activities, breaches of security, and transportation security incident events involving U.S. vessels or persons to the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center. Additional U.S. Coast Guard port specific requirements may be found in Port Security Advisory 1-22 at <https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/InternationalPortSecurity/Port%20Security%20Advisory/PSA%20%201-22%20Remove%20Cote%20d'Ivoire.pdf?ver=6DzYOEswAJQVh7ld4c0ycQ%3d%3d>.

19.7. Contact Information:

- a) Fifth Fleet Battle Watch: cusnc.bwc@me.navy.mil or + 973-1785-3879.
- b) NAVCENT NCAGS:
+973-1785-0033 (Primary/Watch Desk), +973-3940-4523 (Alternate), or m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil.
- c) IMSC: m-ba-ims-c-bwc@us.navy.mil or +973-1785-8412/8192/8193.
IMSC organizational information is available at <https://www.imscentinel.com/>.
- d) UKMTO: watchkeepers@ukmto.org or +44 (0) 2392 222060. UKMTO advisories and warnings are available at <https://www.ukmto.org/>.
- e) U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center: +1-800-424-8802.
- f) USCG NAVCEN: www.navcen.uscg.gov/contact/gps-problem-report or +1-703-313-5900.



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20. Maritime Advisory 2022-007-Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom.

20.1. Issued on 6 July 2022. This revised advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2022-001. Issue: Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) serves as a significant threat to U.S.-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) as well as U.S. mariners onboard a vessel or transiting to or from a vessel in the GoG. Guidance: Mariners transiting this area should visit the Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade-Gulf of Guinea MDAT-GoG) website at <https://gog-mdat.org/home> and the NATO Shipping Centre website at <https://shipping.nato.int/nsc/operations/global-maritime-risk/west-africa-gulf-of-guinea> for additional information on threats and specific recommendations for their vessels.

20.2. Additionally, the “Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security Off the Coast of West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea” (available under the Geography – Gulf of Guinea pull-down menu at <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/>) provides additional guidance and resources for operating in this area. For any maritime industry questions about this advisory, contact GMCC@uscg.mil.

21. Pirate and maritime crime activities in West African waters are assessed as high-risk due to a recent successful hijacking incident. This past week, there were three reports of criminal or piracy activity.

22. LIBERIA: On 14 April, one perpetrator boarded a product tanker at Monrovia Anchorage.

23. In other parts of the world, there were three reports of piracy or crime at sea during the reported period. UMS HQ has lately highlighted the proliferation of crime at sea in Singapore/Indonesian waters. While the criminal activities are primarily confined to petty thefts currently, it would be unthinkable if the perpetrators were to mimic the Nigerian criminals' proven 'business' model by kidnapping a few key crew members and then negotiating for ransoms. The situation could explode to be worse than the present piracy threats in West Africa or the Indian Ocean should this happen!

24. BANGLADESH: On 4 April, five robbers from a wooden boat boarded a general cargo ship while anchored at Chittagong Anchorage.



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- 25.** Korea and Iran continue to provide escort naval services to their flag vessels due to the continued presence and danger posed by Somalia-based piracy threats. These efforts, combined with the increased deployment of armed maritime marshals on board commercial shipping, have significantly reduced the success of Somalia-based piracy in the HRA in hijacking commercial vessels of late but not the presence of pirate groups operating in the HRA. International Intelligence Agencies' assessment is that the existing presence of Somali-based piracy threats can easily be translated to successful hijacks as were experienced in 2009/2010/2011 should these preventive measures be eased off by all stakeholders.

Instructions and Piracy Related News

26. Warning for Red Sea, Bab el-Mandab Straits and Gulf of Aden

26.1. There have been numerous attacks and suspicious approaches reported near the southern entrance to the Bab el Mandeb Strait during the reporting period. Levels of pirate activity in the Indian Ocean remain elevated, with five hijacks reported since March 2017 (MT ARIS 13, CASAYR II NO.30, AL KAUSAR, SALAMA 1 and OS 35). The threat of further attacks and hijacking remains high. All Masters are advised to exercise heightened vigilance within the High Risk Area (HRA), stringently implement BMP4 and liaise closely with embarked armed security teams (AST) and regional authorities. If not making calls in Yemen, it's recommended by UKMTO that vessels should use the IRTC and western lane of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the Bab el Mandeb / southern Red Sea region, to provide a greater lee from Yemen. Further such incidents and hijackings are likely to take place, and all vessels transiting this region are advised to remain vigilant. While international naval patrols and anti-piracy measures on-board commercial vessels have practically eradicated Somali piracy since its peak in early 2011, poverty coupled with other factors that motivate pirates remain and some vessels transiting this region may have increasingly become complacent in the belief that the piracy threat had diminished.

26.2. While the international community has over the past several years taken significant steps in order to improve security in the region, including boosting naval forces in the area and requiring ships to take protection measures, including reporting in and out of high risk areas, sailing at top speed as far away as possible from the Somali coast and travelling with



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armed escorts on-board, the threat of an attack and hijacking remained as the real root of the cause on the ground in Somalia has never been properly addressed. After five years without a successful attack, analysts say that complacency may have set in and this week's successful hijacking is likely to result in potential copycat attacks, as pirate action groups head-out in a bid to successfully hijack a commercial vessel. Masters are advised to remain vigilant at all times inside the HRA and are advised to adhere to strict guidance and protective measures as set down in BMP5. Sailing yachts should avoid transiting the HRA. Past activity has demonstrated that pirates will attack both large and small yachts transiting this region. While successful attacks and hijackings of merchant vessels have significantly decreased over the past two years, the possibility of attacks and the successful hijacking of sailing vessels continue to remain high. This is due to the reduction of revenue sources from pirated merchant vessels and the fact that sailing yachts are vulnerable and easier targets. PAG's continue to conduct "soft approaches" on merchant ships transiting the area. Skiffs have approached vessels in order to probe the reaction of the crewmembers and any possible Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on-board. If the pirate approach does not elicit a response, the pirates will likely proceed with an attack, in which additional skiffs may participate. Vessels transiting the greater Gulf of Aden region should operate under a heightened state of alert. This is due to increasing tensions in the region, which in turn can escalate the potential for direct or collateral damage to vessels transiting the region. These threats may come from a number of different sources such as missiles, projectiles, or waterborne improvised explosive devices. Houthi rebels have claimed responsibility for the 1 October 2016 attack on a UAE vessel.

- 26.3. UMS HQ advises all vessels transiting this region to report any hostile activities immediately. Somali pirates have recently shown an ability to mount hijacking expeditions far out into the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, and inshore traffic might be an easier target. EUNAVFOR spokesperson Commander Jacqui Sherriff said that the recent series of attacks against commercial shipping again highlights the need for vigilance and adherence to self-protection measures (by the deployment of on-board AST) and compliance to Best Management Practices (BMP) 5. It is crucial that Somali pirates are denied opportunities to attack vessels so that there will be no chance of a successful hijack. One successful hijack is one hijack too



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many because it will encourage and motivate more Somalis to taking up piracy!

26.4. CMF and EUNAVFOR and intelligence agencies have warned of increased complacency amongst stakeholders which may give rise to opportunities for piracy action groups and organizations funding piracy activities to revive the threat.

27. Actions to be Taken when a Vessel with On-Board UMS Maritime Marshals is Approached by a Naval Craft.

27.1. On 16 Dec 23, in the face of increased attacks from pirate action groups and approaches from naval craft, UMS HQ issued the orders on actions to be taken when a naval craft approaches a vessel. These orders were issued to all Team Leaders, and they were further personally briefed by the UMS Operation Officer because of the importance of the subject and the requirement that these orders be fully understood and complied with.

27.2. UMS Maritime Marshals onboard a vessel are to protect the vessel and crew members from pirate action groups. They are equipped with weapons and equipment to handle the threat posed by pirate action groups and **ARE NOT MEANT TO DETER NOR OPPOSE ANY NAVAL CRAFT THAT MAY APPROACH THE VESSEL FOR WHATEVER PURPOSES.** The Orders is repeated in the paragraphs below.

27.3. If a naval craft approaches our vessel, the following actions will be taken.

27.3.1. The Team Leader is to alert and discuss the approach of the naval craft with the Master.

27.3.2. The Master must notify the vessel's owner/HQ of the situation.

27.3.3. The team Leader will notify the UMS Operations Officer/UMS HQ.

27.4. If the naval craft asks the vessel to stop, the Master will take the appropriate action, as per his discussion with his HQ.

27.4.1. Based on the decision to stop, the Team Leader will immediately give orders to his Maritime Marshal(s) to unload and clear their weapons.

27.4.2. **NO WEAPON WILL BE LOADED.**



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27.4.3. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL ANY MEMBER OF THE MARITIME MARSHAL TEAM SHOW HIS WEAPON TO DETER THE NAVAL CRAFT, FIRE WARNING SHOTS, OR FIRE ANY SHOT AT THE APPROACHING NAVAL VESSEL. THE TEAM LEADER IS TO ENSURE THIS IS CLEARLY BRIEFED AND UNDERSTOOD TO HIS TEAM MEMBERS. THERE MUST BE NO DEVIATION FROM THIS ORDER.

27.5. When the vessel stops as ordered and naval personnel come on board, UMS Maritime Marshals will take the following actions:

27.5.1. All Maritime Marshals should keep low on the deck and cover their head with both hands, with their hands visible. They will all be together, lined up side by side.

27.5.2. On no account should any Maritime Marshal make any movement that could be misinterpreted as hostile actions. Their individual weapon should be placed on deck next to the Maritime Marshal, and at no time should any Maritime Marshal handle his weapon.

27.5.3. Do not take any videos or photographs.

27.5.4. All Maritime Marshals should be ready to be questioned on their identity and roles. They will answer the questions truthfully and cooperate fully with the naval personnel on board.

27.5.5. The Team Leader will be the spokesperson of the Maritime Marshal Team, working closely with the Master.

27.6. Remember to be cooperative and calm. There is no need to be unduly concerned as the vessel and crew members, including the Maritime Marshal Team, have not committed any wrongdoing.

27.7. After the naval personnel depart and the vessel resumes its mission, the Team Leader reconstitutes the Team to continue the mission.

27.8. The Team Leader will report the matter to UMS HQ accordingly.

28. Piracy in the Indian Ocean HRA has NOT Been Eradicated

28.1. UMS HQ has always maintained this position not to give stakeholders a sense of false security. The current development of piracy raging its ugly



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head again in the waters off Somalia and in the Indian Ocean is testimony to the accuracy of our analysis.

28.2. The decision by world shipping bodies such as BIMCO and the like has given the wrong perception that piracy in the Indian Ocean HRA has been eradicated. **Nothing can be further from the truth!**

28.3. Piracy threats have been reduced due to the strong presence and sustained effort by naval forces, namely EUNAVFOR and the US-led Combined Military Force (CMF) and the deployment of armed security teams (AST) onboard commercial vessels. The deployment of ASTs onboard commercial vessels since the peak of the piracy threat in 2008 has proven effective, as no vessel with an AST has ever been hijacked.

28.4. Naval and intelligence agencies think pirate syndicates lie low due to the strong deterrence and are involved in other criminal activities, such as drug smuggling. These pirate and criminal syndicates have not been wiped out, and given the correct circumstances and environment, they can get their acts together quickly.

28.5. The pirate syndicates are privy to the announcement of the lifting of the HRA. They could view the situation in 2023 as a golden opportunity to resume their proven lucrative 'business'. The current political situation in the Middle East is a significant distraction to the naval forces that will not focus their attention and presence on the more critical military problems with the Iranian-backed Houthis.

28.6. Given Somalia's poor socio-economic situation, thousands of Somalians will be more than happy to take up arms to hunt and hijack commercial vessels again. The lack of local law enforcement to prevent piracy activities will make this revival a strong possibility. Therefore, the comeback scenario cannot be discounted and is a likely possibility.

28.7. Therefore, from a risk assessment point of view, the risk level in 2024, if deterrence measures are removed, the risk of piracy in 2024 will be objectively higher than in the last 5-6 years.

28.8. **Low piracy threat does not mean NO PIRACY THREAT!**

29. Present Tactics Employed by the Houthis and What We Should Do

29.1. UMS HQ recently studied the profile of attacks against commercial vessels and made the following observations.



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- 29.2. They comprised attacks on commercial vessels by 2-3 skiffs with about 5-9 armed personnel on board (POB). Some vessels have ladders to suggest their intention to board the vessels.
- 29.3. They approached the commercial vessels, exchanged fires, and then kept a stand-off distance of about 1-2nm.
- 29.4. In some cases, one or more unmanned surface vessels (USVs) would strike the vessels.
- 29.5. This is what is happening.
- 29.5.1. The POB on board the skiffs could be either pirates working with the Houthis or Houthis personnel themselves.
- 29.5.2. The approach to a vessel is, in military terms, " recce by fire." The objective is to ascertain if the vessel is protected by armed personnel on board because a vessel that is not protected by armed personnel could be easily boarded and hijacked. If they confirmed that the vessel was not protected, they would simply try to board the vessel.
- 29.5.3. Once they confirmed that the vessel is protected, after exchanging fires they will withdraw if they are just pirates not working with the Houthis.
- 29.5.4. If the POB are pirates working with the Houthis or Houthis personnel themselves, they would withdraw to a stand-off distance of about 1-2nm and continue trailing the vessel. Why?
- 29.5.5. The POB would use their laser designator(s) to guide the USV(s) to engage the commercial vessel. These laser designators have an effective range of about 1-2nm and the further the target is, the less accurate the designation of the USV will be against the target vessel. For this reason, have you noticed that these attacks always



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happen in daylight hours because the POB does not have night capabilities to designate their lasers at night or in poor visibility?

29.6. What must we do?

29.6.1. Apply the current SOP when responding to Alert Grey and Alert Red. **The vessel should be transiting at maximum speed.**

29.6.2. After the withdrawal of the skiffs and if the skiffs are still trailing the vessel, it suggests that the threat has not disappeared. Be ready to respond to an attack against USV. UMS HQ has issued an SOP on how to destroy an approaching USV. To perfect this drill, UMS maritime marshals should conduct training and rehearsals regularly as part of their anti-piracy drill.

29.6.3. **The vessel must continue to transit at maximum speed to make it more difficult for the laser designators to designate our vessel.**

29.6.4. After the skiffs' withdrawal, the personnel in the citadel should not remain there as the threat (if any) is different, and they should remain at a location above the vessel's watermark. This presupposes that all Masters have designated this location and approved it by their respective Company Chief Security and Safety Office.

30. EU Extends Naval Operation ATALANTA Until 2027 as Somali Piracy Surges in Indian Ocean

30.1. In last week's WETA, UMS HQ warned that with the Indian Ocean monsoon season-ending, Somali-based piracy activities could be expected to rise. As this is not bad enough news, the European Council, based on the socio-political and economic situation of Somalia and neighbouring countries, has extended its counter-piracy mission, Operation ATALANTA, for two more years, coming amid a dramatic resurgence of Somali piracy that has seen 43 incidents in the past year.



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- 30.2. The renewed mandate to February 2027 strengthens ATALANTA's role in maritime security across the Somalia coast, Gulf of Aden, West Indian Ocean, and parts of the Red Sea. The operation will maintain its focus on combating piracy while expanding efforts to reduce illicit trafficking at sea.
- 30.3. Recent intelligence reports highlight the necessity of the extension. In October 2024, Somali authorities confirmed a group of 13 heavily armed pirates, equipped with AK-47s and RPGs, departed from Ceel Huur Area toward the Somali Basin. Earlier this month, a Chinese fishing vessel allegedly hijacked off Somalia's northeastern Puntland coast.
- 30.4. The pirates' typical strategy involves hijacking dhows to use as mother ships, enabling attacks up to 600 nautical miles off Somalia's eastern coast. The Gulf of Aden's eastern region remains particularly vulnerable.
- 30.5. This year has already seen significant piracy incidents, including the hijacking of two merchant vessels. The *MV Abdullah* was released after a reported \$4 million ransom payment, while the *MV Ruen* required Indian Navy intervention after a three-month captivity.
- 30.6. Experts suggest the situation in the region has been exacerbated by the maritime industry's reduced security measures following the removal of the Indian Ocean High Risk Area designation in January 2023.
- 30.7. Operation ATALANTA, established in 2008, has played a crucial role in maritime security, protecting World Food Programme vessels and other vulnerable shipping in the region. The mission's extension comes alongside renewed mandates for EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia, forming part of a comprehensive EU strategy to enhance regional security capabilities.
- 30.8. With the Indian Ocean monsoon season concluding, maritime security experts anticipate increased piracy activity in the coming months. This development, coupled with ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, presents a complex security challenge for international shipping in the region.

31. Somali Pirates Head Back to Sea

- 31.1. Shipping has been warned that Somali pirates are back hunting for targets.



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- 31.2. British maritime security consultants Ambrey has issued a notice to clients detailing a suspected pirate action group sighted departing Marreya, Eyl, to the northeast of Somalia.
- 31.3. Merchant vessels are advised to increase vigilance, and to engage armed security where possible if the vessel has a permissible freeboard.
- 31.4. Yesterday the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA reported that a Yemeni-flagged dhow was taken by pirates on Sunday. Then dhow is now likely being used by pirates as a mother ship to stage attacks on merchant vessels.
- 31.5. Piracy was rampant off Somalia for a four-year period from 2008, but then it went dormant for about five years. From March last year, Somali pirates have been back in the headlines, abducting a number of vessels and their crews.

32. U.S. in Talks with Yemeni Forces on Land Offensive Against Houthis

- 32.1. Yemeni forces opposed to the Houthis are in talks with the US and Gulf Arab allies about a possible land offensive to oust the militant group from the Red Sea coast, according to people involved in the discussions.
- 32.2. The conversations come about a month into a US-led aerial assault against the Houthis ordered by President Donald Trump, an operation yet to achieve its aim of ending the Iran-backed group's attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, a vital trade route, and Israel.
- 32.3. A Yemeni ground offensive, which could include an attempt to recapture the capital Sanaa after more than a decade under Houthi control, would significantly broaden and intensify that campaign. It would not involve US troops, the people said.
- 32.4. The US and regional work to escalate military pressure against the Houthis has become more urgent due to growing international concern over links between the Yemen-based group and al-Shabaab, an affiliate of Al-Qaeda based across the Gulf of Aden in the Horn of Africa,



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including Somalia. The Houthis are colluding with al-Shabaab on training and weapons smuggling, according to US Africa Command.

- 32.5. “This is now another reason for the world to confront the Houthis and liberate Yemen from their grip,” said Hamed Ghaleb, a top aide to Tariq Saleh, a member of the leadership council of Yemen’s internationally recognized government in the southern port city of Aden.
- 32.6. Trump has commented on the Houthi-Somali link, posting that the US “will support the Somali People, who should not allow the Houthis to embed (which they are trying to do!), to end terrorism.”
- 32.7. The head of US Central Command, Michael Kurilla, held talks in the Saudi Arabian capital of Riyadh this month with the chiefs of staff of the Saudi and Yemeni armed forces.
- 32.8. The generals discussed “ongoing efforts against the Iran-backed Houthis,” the Pentagon said, without elaborating. Those involved in the meetings on the Saudi and Yemeni sides said the talks focused on how a Yemeni ground operation could leverage US airstrikes to further degrade the Houthis.
- 32.9. A spokesperson for CENTCOM, which oversees the US military in the Middle East, declined to give further information beyond the statement issued after Kurilla’s visit. The White House National Security Council didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
- 32.10. One scenario involves a multi-front assault, coordinated with the US military, with the aim of driving the Houthis out of the key port of Hodeida — a source of many of their attacks — and building pressure on them in Sanaa, said the people, who asked not to be identified discussing sensitive matters.
- 32.11. “A land operation is a must to build on the great successes of the airstrikes,” said Saleh’s senior advisor Ghaleb, adding that discussions are taking place but no final decision has been made.
- 32.12. Tariq Saleh is the nephew of former Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who briefly allied with the Houthis after they captured Sanaa in 2014



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but was later killed by them in a power struggle. He is based in Mocha, about 180 kilometers (112 miles) south of Hodeida, where he commands more than 50,000 fighters with support from the United Arab Emirates.

32.13. His forces have worked closely with the US military to help stop Iran shipping weapons to the Houthis, according to Ghaleb.

32.14. Saleh has been working on strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia, which in 2015 led a previous effort to oust the Houthis that included the UAE. The Riyadh-led coalition was later forced to abandon the campaign, due to both Western concern over the civilian death toll and the impact of missile and drone attacks on the kingdom, including its vital oil installations.

32.15. While both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have concerns they'll again end up bearing the brunt of any escalation of military operations, there's a sense that Trump's willingness to up the ante against Iran and its proxies presents an opportunity to upend the balance of power in favor of their Yemeni allies, according to people with knowledge of the thinking in both Gulf capitals.

32.16. A spokesperson for the UAE's Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not immediately provide comment. A Saudi Ministry of Defense spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment.

32.17. Solidarity Campaign

32.17.1. The stated objective of the US bombing of the Houthis has been to curtail the group's attacks on Red Sea shipping, a campaign they began in solidarity with Hamas following the start of Israel's war with the Palestinian group in 2023. Like the Houthis, Hamas is backed by Iran and designated a terrorist organization by Washington.

32.17.2. The US has been cagey about releasing battlefield assessments of the latest military effort in Yemen but it appears to be more intensive and sustained than the one started under former President Joe Biden in January 2024. A US defense official told Bloomberg News earlier this month that Houthi targets are being



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struck day and night, resulting in the killing of several of the group's leaders, as well as the destruction of command and control facilities, air-defense systems and weapons manufacturing and storage sites.

32.17.3. Health authorities in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen say over 120 people have been killed since Trump ordered the strikes in on March 15.

32.17.4. The US is currently engaged in talks with Iran about its nuclear program, with negotiations likely to extend to Tehran's influence over its various allied militia. The most powerful of those was formerly Lebanon's Hezbollah, which was severely weakened in an Israeli offensive in the second half of last year.

32.17.5. There's a risk of overstating the losses suffered by Iran and its proxies since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, and of underestimating the ability of the Houthis to fight independently, warned Matthew Levitt, who directs the counter-terrorism and intelligence program at the Washington Institute.

32.17.6. Iran "has had a big setback but at the end of the day not a single one of their proxies has been completely destroyed," he said.

32.17.7. The Houthis have been defiant about their appetite for a protracted conflict with the US and its allies, having proved steadfast over more than a decade since their capture of Sanaa.

32.17.8. "We have chosen to be lions in confronting these enemies," leader Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi said in a speech last week.

33. Report: Chinese Satellites Feed Houthis Target Ship Data

33.1. U.S. officials are asserting that Chinese companies are providing support to the Houthi militants in Yemen with their attacks on Western shipping. The Financial Times is quoting a senior U.S. State Department official who says the Houthis have been receiving Chinese satellite data in addition to support from Iran for the attacks that started in late 2023 and targeted more than 100 merchant ships.



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- 33.2. It was previously well understood that the Houthis were receiving targeting data for their missile and drone attacks on Israel and shipping in the Red Sea from both Russia and Iran, with IRGC Qods Force operatives based in Yemen acting as the conduit. The Iranian Khayyam satellite was jointly built with Russia, based on Kanopus-V imagery satellite, with the Iranian satellite likely to be operating within Russia's own Kanopus-V constellation. The Iranians and Russians are likely to share most of the output of this combined constellation. Supplementing the satellite imagery data, the Iranians would have added in their own intelligence feeds from IRGC spy ships and regular Iranian Navy ships operating in the area, prior to these vessels being withdrawn from the area several months ago.
- 33.3. A senior State Department official in Washington briefed the Financial Times that the Chinese company Chang Guang Satellite Technology, a commercial entity owned by or with close links to the Chinese People's Liberation Army, has also been feeding targeting data to the Houthis. Chang Guang Satellite is reported to have had 100 mini-satellites in orbit in 2024, a figure which was planned to rise to 300 by the end of 2025. With such a constellation, a 10-minute refresh time would be feasible for any point in the target area.
- 33.4. The Financial Times report was unclear whether raw imagery was being passed to the Houthis, or whether processed information was shared either as intelligence or in the form of targeting packs. Chinese military standard communications equipment that would enable such transmission has regularly been seized in the same consignments of arms and ammunition dispatched by the IRGC Qods Force to the Houthis but intercepted at sea by Coalition naval forces. With the reported withdrawal of IRGC Qods Force embeds in the Houthi command and control structure, in the face of targeted US attacks, there will be even greater emphasis on building data links to support the Houthis remotely as the American attacks continue, destroying and degrading the Houthis' existing communications networks.
- 33.5. The unnamed senior State Department official briefing the Financial Times was supported by Tammy Bruce, the State Department spokeswoman, who was quoted on the record as confirming that Chang Guang Satellite Technology was "directly supporting Iran-backed Houthi terrorist attacks on US interests". The feed of information from the State Department as opposed to the Defense Department suggests that the



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Chinese behavior is being considered as a factor in broader discussions with China on matters of tariff and trade.

33.6. Surveillance carried out by the Chinese satellites may also enable the Chinese to warn off the Houthis from attacking Chinese ships as they transit the area. Chinese vessels are still regularly using the Gulf of Aden to Suez Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, giving them a simple commercial advantage over shipping lines obliged by Houthi attacks to take the long way between Asia and Europe around the Cape of Good Hope.

34. Piracy Reporting Centre: Singapore Straits Emerge as Piracy Hotspot

34.1. Global piracy and armed robbery incidents against ships have risen sharply in the first quarter of 2025, with a notable 35% increase compared to the same period last year. The surge is primarily driven by a significant spike in incidents within the Singapore Straits.

34.2. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports 45 incidents in Q1 2025, including 37 vessel boardings, four hijackings, and four attempted attacks. The human impact remains severe, with 37 crew members taken hostage, 13 kidnapped, two threatened, and one injured.

34.3. The Singapore Straits have emerged as a particular concern, with 27 reported incidents compared to just seven during the same period in 2024.

34.4. “The reported rise of incidents in the Singapore Straits is concerning, highlighting the urgent need to protect the safety of seafarers navigating these waters,” said IMB Director Michael Howlett.

34.5. While the Gulf of Guinea shows historically low incident rates, recent attacks demonstrate ongoing risks. Two separate attacks resulted in 13 crew members being kidnapped, including 10 from a bitumen tanker near Sao Tome and Principe and three from a fishing vessel south of Ghana.

34.6. Somalia has also seen renewed piracy activity, with three vessels hijacked between February and March 2025, resulting in 26 crew members being taken hostage. All crew members and vessels have since been released.



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34.7. The IMB continues to advise vessels in these high-risk areas to maintain strict adherence to the latest Industry Best Management Practice (BMP) guideline

35. Pakistan-led Combined Task Force 151 conducts Focused Operation SEA SPIRIT

35.1. A Counter-piracy Focused Operation by Combined Maritime Forces' Counter-piracy Combined Task Force 151 in coordination with European Union Naval Forces' Operation ATLANTA will be conducted in Gulf of Aden, Socotra Gap and off Somali East Coast between 21 and 26 Apr. During the operation, multinational naval units, aircraft & personnel will operating under Pakistan-led Combined Task Force 151"

35.2. Aim of the operation is to:

35.2.1. Deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery in piracy-prone areas

35.2.2. Understand and analyze Pattern of Life (POL) in the area . Reassure maritime community through enhanced multinational naval presence.

35.2.3. Merchant Vessels are invited to interact with naval units and encouraged for valuable contribution towards better understanding Pattern of Life in Combined Maritime Forces' Area of Operations.

35.3. During the operation, mariners are advised to navigate with caution whilst transiting the area as naval ships may be conducting extensive flying and small craft operations.

36. West Africa

36.1. Unlike the presence and substantial involvement of international navies, numbering more than 43 countries and the legit deployment of



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armed security team (AST) onboard commercial vessels transiting the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA, the situation in the West Africa HRA is about just the opposite. Nigerian government laws and regulations prohibit the deployment of ASTs other than those brokered by local security companies that used personnel from the Navy, which the government has declared as not supported by it. Besides the Nigerian Navy, no other naval forces provide security and deterrence to the pirates managed by criminal syndicates operating from Nigeria.

36.2. In other words, the waters and ports around Nigeria are almost a perfect hunting ground for the local criminal syndicates. Given this situation, the threat of piracy at this point of time is higher and more dangerous than that posed by Somali pirates in the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA, although depending on the continued presence of the navies of EUNAVFOR and CMF and the other independent naval forces and the continued used of on-board ASTs, the situation may quickly reverse. Somali pirates still have the intent, skills, and resources to attack merchant ships. Fundamentally naval forces and intelligence agencies have repeatedly called for continued vigilance and preparedness in the fight against the threat of piracy at both the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA and the West Africa HRA. Ignoring these warnings places one's business, vessels, and crew members at risk!

36.3. Intelligence agencies noted that Nigeria's pirate action groups (PAGs) have been relatively quiet in the last 2-3 months. However, this does not suggest that the piracy threat in West Africa has been eradicated. PAGs may strike anytime and the only protection and solution is to be well prepared for such an eventuality.

37. UMS HQ advises all stakeholders never to take the security and safety of their vessels and crew members for granted. CURRENT LOW PIRACY THREAT doesn't mean NO PIRACY THREAT!



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38. Remember Always “Be Vigilant, Be Safe and Never Be Sorry”

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