



Universal Maritime Solutions Pte Ltd  
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## **WEEKLY THREAT ADVISORY NO. 649**

(7 - 13 March 2024)

### **Summary of Threat Activities and Conclusion**

1. Pirate and maritime crime activity in East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA continued to be high for thirteen consecutive weeks, during which at least seven successful hijacks occurred, including one this past week. UMS HQ noted three reports of attacks arising from political conflicts and piracy-related activities during the reporting period.
2. INDIAN OCEAN: On 12 March, armed Somali pirates hijacked a bulk carrier approximately 600 NM east of Mogadishu, Somalia. See paragraphs nos 36 to 38.
3. RED SEA: On 11 March, two missiles fired from Houthi-controlled territory targeted an underway container ship approximately 70 NM southwest of Saleef, Yemen.
4. GULF OF ADEN: On 8 March, two missiles fired from Houthi-controlled territory targeted an underway bulk carrier approximately 50 NM southeast of Aden, Yemen.
5. Based on the geopolitical development, the forecast is that the piracy situation will get worse as the conflict between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and other Arab factions intensifies. The recent attacks by the US and UK against Houthi targets in Yemen will only deepen the problem, and pirate syndicates will make use of the turmoil and chaos to conduct attacks of opportunity against defenceless commercial shipping.
6. There are now reported attempts by the US to engage Iran to help reduce the hostilities, including an offer of USD 1.6 billion to the Houthis to stop their attacks on selected targets in the Red Sea. The US and its allies now realise that their past targeting efforts against the Houthis are not yielding much results and need to find other solutions.
7. There have been some calls by some ignorant commercial bodies that do not understand the threat deeply and well enough to call for the removal of AST



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onboard commercial vessels due to concerns that the onboard AST might cause an incident with approaching naval craft. While the concerns are reasonable, the proposed solution to remove the onboard AST is highly unprofessional and dangerous. Implementing it would make the commercial vessels concerned 'sitting ducks' in the face of attacks by Somali pirates who take advantage of the chaos and distractions caused by the conflict. Some intelligence sources have established that some pirate action groups are working in cahoot with the Houthis. Therefore, we should see the increased attacks by Somali pirates linked with the Houthis activities in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. For this reason, UMS HQ instructed how UMS Maritime Marshals will respond and behave when confronted with this situation. See paragraph 34.

8. All vessels in the vicinity are, therefore, to exercise caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO.
9. In the latest quarterly report by UKMTO, it was reported that there has been an increased incidence of suspicious sightings compared to a year ago before the lifting off of the HRA by commercial shipping bodies. Intelligence agencies have unanimously agreed that there would be attempts by pirates' syndicates to exploit hopefully a relaxed attitude by the shipping community, and today we are seeing the manifestation of the situation happening. In other words, the possibility of a successful hijack can only be prevented if vessels have on-board armed security teams (AST) to deter and if necessary, prevent any attack and boarding by pirates.
10. The main message of the Quarterly Reporting by UKMTO is that piracy has been suppressed but not eradicated. So long as the socio-politico-economic problems of Somalia and Yemen are unresolved, the threat of piracy against commercial shipping will remain.
11. All Masters and UMS Maritime are advised to remain vigilant. The increased piracy related activities in the waters of Indian Ocean and East Africa/Red Sea have in fact been anticipated by intelligence agencies by the removal of the HRA by world commercial bodies but not by the War Committee that assessed that the present situation has inadvertently increased the threat level.
12. UKMTO and other intelligence agencies have noticed increased activities by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). This recent development brings a new equation and range of challenges to the safety of commercial vessels transiting in waters



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that are prone to pirates' attacks in the Northern Indian Ocean and Southern Red Sea and maritime security operations. UMS HQ repeats the article on the subject in paragraph 31 given its importance in understanding the capabilities of UAV in maritime security operations (in particular paragraph 31.6) for a detailed exposition.

13. The hijacks of product tanker MONJASA Reformer and Success tanker in West Africa waters remind all stakeholders that we cannot be complacent and take security nonchalantly. A successful hijack is an incident waiting to happen if ship owners, Masters and on-board Maritime Marshals are not serious about security thus putting their crew members' lives and their family interests in jeopardy. A vessel transiting in waters that can possibly be attacked by pirates that are without armed security protection has a high risk of being hijacked. Therefore, for the sake of the security of the lives of the crew members on board, the presence of an armed security team cannot be over-emphasised.

14. **2024-001-Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden, Northwestern Indian Ocean, Somali Basin, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz, and Persian Gulf-Threats to Commercial Vessels**

14.1. This advisory replaces and cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2023-011 and U.S. Maritime Alert 2024-001B

14.2. Issue: Regional conflict, military activity, and piracy pose significant threats to commercial vessels operating in the above listed geographic areas as evidenced by recent Houthi attacks and Somali piracy activity. The U.S. government is continually assessing the maritime security situation in the region to safeguard freedom of navigation, ensure the free flow of commerce, and protect U.S. vessels, personnel, and interests. The recent standup of Operation Prosperity Guardian is one of many examples of U.S. and international cooperative maritime security operations within this region. The following are currently deemed to be the most pressing threats to U.S.-flagged and U.S.-affiliated commercial vessels throughout this region.

14.3. **Houthi Hostile Actions:** Commercial vessels transiting the Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden are at an elevated risk of hostile actions from the Houthis. Hostile actions include one-way Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks; ballistic and cruise missile attacks; small arms fire from small boats; explosive boat attacks; and illegal boardings, detentions, and/or seizures. There have been at least 30



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separate Houthi attacks on commercial vessels and one Houthi seizure of a commercial vessel in these areas, affecting over 55 nations since November 19, 2023. In November 2023, the Houthis conducted a helicopter-borne landing and seizure of a Bahamas-flagged commercial vessel in the Southern Red Sea. Entities claiming to be Yemeni authorities have also attempted to direct commercial vessels in the Southern Red Sea to divert to Yemen. These threats pose both direct and collateral risks to U.S.-flagged and U.S.-affiliated commercial vessels transiting in international shipping lanes, or otherwise operating in these areas.

14.3.1. U.S.-flagged commercial vessels operating in these areas are advised to remain as far as possible from Yemen's territorial sea without compromising navigational safety. Crewmembers should be especially vigilant when at anchor, operating in restricted maneuvering conditions, or proceeding at slow speeds.

14.3.2. Coordinate voyage planning with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) and consider their recommendations and guidance whenever possible. NAVCENT NCAGS stands a 24-hour watch and has the latest information on the current maritime security threats and the operational environment in this region.

14.3.3. The route taken through these areas, and timing of the transit, remains at the discretion of individual companies and vessel Masters. Transiting these areas during hours of darkness may frustrate efforts to target vessels.

14.3.4. Adherence to all U.S. and international requirements and guidance regarding operation of AIS remains the responsibility of individual companies and vessel Masters. Ships operating with AIS switched on and off have both been the object of Houthi attacks. Switching AIS off makes it marginally more difficult to track or target a ship but may also hinder the ability of coalition forces to provide support.

14.3.5. U.S.-flagged commercial vessels are advised to provide hourly positional email updates to the NAVCENT NCAGS detachment when transiting these areas.

14.3.6. Maritime operators are advised to alert their crews to the fact that all electronics signals from their vessels pose a risk to maritime operations.



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14.3.7. A missile strike on a Marshall Islands-flagged commercial tanker in the Gulf of Aden on January 26, 2024 resulted in a significant onboard fire. U.S.-flagged commercial vessels carrying flammable, explosive, or otherwise hazardous cargoes are strongly advised to reconsider transit through these areas. However, if planning voyages through these areas, vessels should take all prudent safety precautions, including thoroughly preparing for emergency responses, and considering carriage of additional safety and damage control preparedness supplies and equipment, such as those needed to extinguish fires.

14.3.8. If hailed on VHF by the Houthis, or entities claiming to be Yemeni authorities, and instructed to alter course to Al Hudaydah or another location on the northwest coast of Yemen, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should ignore the VHF call and continue their passage if safe to do so.

14.3.9. If the Houthis seek to board U.S.-flagged commercial vessels in these areas, the ship's Master should, if the safety of the ship and crew would not be compromised, decline permission to board, noting that the vessel is proceeding in accordance with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

14.3.10. When combined with evasive maneuvering, vessels transiting these areas with armed security details onboard have successfully deterred boarding by individuals in approaching small craft. The decision whether to embark a contracted armed security detail and assessment of associated risks is the responsibility of individual companies and vessel Masters, who are responsible for establishing use of force guidance and pre-planned responses for vessels carrying contracted armed security details.

14.3.11. If Houthis board a U.S.-flagged commercial vessel without a contracted armed security detail onboard, the crew should not forcibly resist the boarding party. Refraining from forcible resistance does not imply consent or agreement to that boarding.

14.3.12. When operating in these waters, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should maintain a vigilant lookout at all times. If U.S.-flagged commercial vessels observe or hear a suspected UAV or missile or observe a small boat approaching with apparent hostile intent, crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of



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the vessel should be relocated to a safe space until the threat has passed. Additional precautions should be taken to ensure small boats are kept at a safe distance whenever possible.

14.3.13. In addition to U.S. Maritime Alerts and this Advisory, interim industry transit advice for the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has been established by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). CMF guidance messages are available on the Maritime Global Security website at [maritimeglobalsecurity.org/geography/goa-etc/](https://maritimeglobalsecurity.org/geography/goa-etc/).

**14.4. Iranian Illegal Boarding/Detention/Seizure:** Commercial vessels transiting the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea are at risk of being illegally boarded and detained or seized by Iranian forces. Recent incidents include the April 2023 Iranian seizure of a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel in the Gulf of Oman, the May 2023 Iranian seizure of a Panama-flagged vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, and the January 2024 Iranian seizure of a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel in the Arabian Sea. Iranian forces attempted to seize one Marshall Islands-flagged vessel and one Bahamas-flagged vessel in the Gulf of Oman during July 2023, but were prevented from doing so by U.S. Naval Forces. Iranian forces have utilized small boats and helicopters during boarding operations and have attempted to force commercial vessels into Iranian territorial water

14.4.1. If hailed by Iranian forces, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should provide vessel name and flag state and affirm that they are proceeding in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

14.4.2. If Iranian forces seek to board a U.S.-flagged commercial vessel navigating these waters, the ship's Master should, if the safety of the ship and crew would not be compromised, decline permission to board, noting that the vessel is proceeding in accordance with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

14.4.3. If Iranian forces board a U.S.-flagged commercial vessel, the crew should not forcibly resist the boarding party. Refraining from forcible resistance does not imply consent or agreement to that boarding.

14.4.4. It is recommended that vessels in the Persian Gulf remain as far as possible from Iran's territorial sea without compromising navigational safety. When transiting eastbound in the Strait of



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Hormuz, it is recommended that vessels transit close to Oman's territorial sea.

14.4.5. Industry transit advice for the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman was established on 9 November 2023, and can be found on the Maritime Global Security website at [maritimeglobalsecurity.org/geography/goa-etc/](https://maritimeglobalsecurity.org/geography/goa-etc/).

14.5. **Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:** Recent cases of piracy pose a threat to commercial vessels operating in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Somali Basin, and Northwestern Indian Ocean. Since November 2023, there have been three boarding/hijacking incidents, representing the first such attacks against commercial shipping in the region since March 2017. Pirates may utilize captured fishing vessels as motherships to target vessels operating hundreds of miles from the coast of Somalia. In November 2023, one Liberian-flagged vessel was boarded in the Gulf of Aden; in December 2023, one Malta-flagged vessel was hijacked in the Arabian Sea; and in January 2024, one Liberia-flagged bulk carrier was boarded in the Indian Ocean. Specific case details are available via the Office of Naval Intelligence's weekly "Worldwide Threat to Shipping" product at <https://www.oni.navy.mil/ONI-Reports/Shipping-Threat-Reports/Worldwide-Threat-to-Shipping/>.

14.5.1. The Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea (BMP5), and Maritime Global Security website at: <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org> should be consulted prior to operating in the above listed geographic waters.

14.5.2. Transit by yachts and privately owned sailing vessels through the region is hazardous and may result in capture. The U.S. Government advises against all operation of yachts and pleasure craft in these areas. American citizens abroad should inform the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate of their plans to transit the area and/or update their information via the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program at: <https://step.state.gov/step/>. Yachting guidance can be found at: <https://on-shore.mschoa.org/reference-documents/advice-for-sailing-vessels>.

14.5.3. **UAVs:** Outside of the Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden, UAV attacks also pose a threat to commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea. The most recent attacks were on a Malta-flagged





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vessel in the Arabian Sea in November 2023, and on a Liberian-flagged vessel in the Arabian Sea in December 2023.

- If U.S.-flagged commercial vessels observe or hear a suspected UAV, crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be relocated to a safe space on the vessel until the threat has passed.

**14.6. Limpet Mines:** Limpet mines have been used to damage commercial vessels on multiple occasions in recent years and are primarily a threat to commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. Limpet mines, or similar improvised explosive devices, can be attached to vessel hulls, above or below the waterline, via swimmers or small boats, while a vessel is berthed, at anchor, or underway.

14.6.1. When operating in these waters, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels should maintain a close lookout and remain vigilant for suspicious activity to include the approach of swimmers or small boats. Close attention should be given to the vessel's waterline, especially at slow speeds, at anchor, and when moored.

14.6.2. If a mine has been, or was attempted to have been, attached to a vessel, crewmembers not needed for the safe navigation and operation of the vessel should be relocated to a safe space on the vessel until the threat has passed.

14.6.3. Guidance: U.S.-flagged commercial vessels operating in these waters are advised to exercise caution, review security measures, and monitor VHF Channel 16. To afford best protection in the region, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels are also advised to in the event of any attack, incident, or suspicious activity, immediately:

15.6.3.1. Activate the Ship Security Alert System

15.6.3.2. Contact the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch

15.6.3.3. Contact UKMTO

15.6.3.4. Simultaneously register with both the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Office (UKMTO) and the IMSC watch 24 hours prior to entering the Indian Ocean Voluntary Reporting Area by sending UKMTO and IMSC, via a single e-mail, the Initial Report from Annex D of (BMP5). Include the estimated times of arrival at the Suez





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Canal, Bab el Mandeb Strait (BAM), and Strait of Hormuz (SoH) in line 10 of the report and add line 14 for comments as needed (e.g., speed restrictions or other constraints, anticipated time of entering/exiting the SoH Traffic Separation Scheme; an outline of the navigation plan for operating in the SoH and Persian Gulf, etc.). Utilize other reports included in Annex D of BMP5 as necessary.

15.6.3.5. Vessels operating in this area are advised to include both NAVCENT NCAGS and the IMSC watch on all updates or incident report emails. By including both as addressees on each email, awareness will be enhanced without creating an additional reporting burden.

15.6.3.6. Conduct a pre-voyage risk assessment and incorporate appropriate protective measures into vessel security plans.

15.6.3.7. The Maritime Global Security website at <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/> offers industry issued best practices and guidance to mariners by geographic region and provides contact and subscription information for regional maritime security reporting centers, particularly in high risk-areas.

15.6.3.8. Answer all VHF calls from coalition navies. Vessels should be aware that U.S. and other coalition naval forces may conduct maritime awareness calls, queries, and approaches to ensure the safety of vessels transiting these listed waters.

15.6.3.9. Due to the risks of piracy, kidnapping, hijacking, and robbery while operating within U.S. Coast Guard designated High Risk Waters, U.S.-flagged commercial vessels are required to comply with the Guidelines for U.S. Vessels Operating in High-Risk Waters contained in U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security Directive 104-6 (Rev 8) and comply with their Coast Guard approved Vessel Security Plan annex on counter piracy. The U.S. Coast Guard Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance announced in the Federal Register in August 2021 the availability of Revision 8 to Maritime Security (MARSEC) Directive 104-6. U.S. vessel owners and operators who needed to act under previous versions of MARSEC Directive 104-6 should immediately contact their local Coast Guard Captain of the Port or District Commander for a copy of Revision 8.

15.6.3.10. Per 33 CFR 101.305, report all suspicious activities, breaches of security, and transportation security incident events



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involving U.S. vessels or persons to the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center. Additional U.S. Coast Guard port specific requirements may be found in Port Security Advisory 1-22 at <https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/InternationalPortSecurity/Port%20Security%20Advisory/PSA%20%201-22%20Remove%20Cote%20d'Ivoire.pdf?ver=6DzYOEswAJQVh7ld4c0ycQ%3d%3d>.

### 15.7. Contact Information:

- a) Fifth Fleet Battle Watch: [cusnc.bwc@me.navy.mil](mailto:cusnc.bwc@me.navy.mil) or + 973-1785-3879.
- b) NAVCENT NCAGS:  
+973-1785-0033 (Primary/Watch Desk), +973-3940-4523 (Alternate), or [m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil](mailto:m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil).
- c) IMSC: [m-ba-ims-c-bwc@us.navy.mil](mailto:m-ba-ims-c-bwc@us.navy.mil) or +973-1785-8412/8192/8193. IMSC organizational information is available at <https://www.imscentinel.com/>.
- d) UKMTO: [watchkeepers@ukmto.org](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.org) or +44 (0) 2392 222060. UKMTO advisories and warnings are available at <https://www.ukmto.org/>.
- e) U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center: +1-800-424-8802.
- f) USCG NAVCEN: [www.navcen.uscg.gov/contact/gps-problem-report](http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/contact/gps-problem-report) or +1-703-313-5900.

## 15. Maritime Advisory 2022-007-Gulf of Guinea-Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom.

15.1. Issued on: 6 July 2022. This revised advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2022-001. Issue: Piracy/Armed Robbery/Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) serve as a significant threat to U.S.-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) as well as U.S. mariners onboard a vessel or transiting to or from a vessel in the GoG. Guidance: Mariners transiting this area should visit the Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade-Gulf of Guinea MDAT-GoG) website at <https://gog-mdat.org/home> and the NATO Shipping Centre website at <https://shipping.nato.int/nsc/operations/global-maritime-risk/west-africa-gulf-of-guinea> for additional information on threats and specific recommendations for their vessels.



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- 15.2. Additionally, the “Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security Off the Coast of West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea” (available under the Geography – Gulf of Guinea pull-down menu at <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/>) provides additional guidance and resources for operating in this area. For any maritime industry questions about this advisory, contact [GMCC@uscg.mil](mailto:GMCC@uscg.mil). This Advisory will automatically expire on 2 January 2023
16. U.S. Maritime Advisory 2023-001-Gulf of Guinea-Piracy /Armed Robbery/ Kidnapping for Ransom Issued on 3 January 2023. This revised advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2022-007. Issue: Piracy/Armed Robbery at Sea/Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) serve as a significant threat to U.S.-flagged vessels transiting or operating in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) as we as U.S. mariners onboard a vessel or transiting to or from a vessel in the GoG. Guidance: Mariners transiting this area should visit the maritime Domain Awareness for Trade-Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG) website at <https://gog-mdat.org/home> and the NATO Shipping Centre website at <https://shipping.nato.int/ncs/operations/global-maritime-risk/west-africa-gulf-of-guinea> for additional information on threats and specific recommendations for their vessels. Additionally, the “Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security Off the Coast of West Africa including the Gulf of Guinea” (available under the Geography – Gulf of Guinea pull-down menu at <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/>) provides additional guidance and resources for operating in this area. For any maritime industry questions about this advisory, contact [GMCC@uscg.mil](mailto:GMCC@uscg.mil). This Advisory will automatically expire on 2 July 2023.
17. Pirate and maritime crime activities in West African waters are at a low level. There was one report of piracy or crime at sea during this period.
18. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: On 10 March, as many as eight perpetrators boarded a container ship berthed at Banana Port
19. In other parts of the world, there was one report of piracy or crime at sea in other parts of the world.
20. INDONESIA: On 6 March, three perpetrators armed with metal rods boarded an underway bulk carrier in the eastbound lane of the Singapore Strait Traffic Separation Scheme.



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21. The navies of China, Japan, India, Russia, Korea and Iran continue to provide escort naval services to their flag vessels due to the continued presence and danger posed by Somalia-based piracy threats. These efforts, combined with the increased deployment of armed maritime marshals on board commercial shipping, have significantly reduced the success of Somalia-based piracy in the HRA in hijacking commercial vessels of late but not the presence of pirate groups operating in the HRA. International Intelligence Agencies' assessment is that existing presence of Somali-based piracy threats can easily be translated to successful hijacks as were experienced in 2009/2010/2011 by should these preventive measures be eased off by all stakeholders.

### **Instructions and Piracy Related News**

#### **22. Warning for Red Sea, Bab el-Mandab Straits and Gulf of Aden**

22.1. There have been numerous attacks and suspicious approaches reported near the southern entrance to the Bab el Mandeb Strait during the reporting period. Levels of pirate activity in the Indian Ocean remain elevated, with five hijacks reported since March 2017 (MT ARIS 13, CASAYR II NO.30, AL KAUSAR, SALAMA 1 and OS 35). The threat of further attacks and hijacking remains high. All Masters are advised to exercise heightened vigilance within the High Risk Area (HRA), stringently implement BMP4 and liaise closely with embarked armed security teams (AST) and regional authorities. If not making calls in Yemen, it's recommended by UKMTO that vessels should use the IRTC and western lane of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the Bab el Mandeb / southern Red Sea region, to provide a greater lee from Yemen. Further such incidents and hijackings are likely to take place, and all vessels transiting this region are advised to remain vigilant. While international naval patrols and anti-piracy measures on-board commercial vessels have practically eradicated Somali piracy since its peak in early 2011, poverty coupled with other factors that motivate pirates remain and some vessels transiting this region may have increasingly become complacent in the belief that the piracy threat had diminished.

22.2. While the international community has over the past several years taken significant steps in order to improve security in the region, including boosting naval forces in the area and requiring ships to take protection measures, including reporting in and out of high risk areas, sailing at top speed as far away as possible from the Somali coast and travelling with



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armed escorts on-board, the threat of an attack and hijacking remained as the real root of the cause on the ground in Somalia has never been properly addressed. After five years without a successful attack, analysts say that complacency may have set in and this week's successful hijacking is likely to result in potential copycat attacks, as pirate action groups head-out in a bid to successfully hijack a commercial vessel. Masters are advised to remain vigilant at all times inside the HRA and are advised to adhere to strict guidance and protective measures as set down in BMP5. Sailing yachts should avoid transiting the HRA. Past activity has demonstrated that pirates will attack both large and small yachts transiting this region. While successful attacks and hijackings of merchant vessels have significantly decreased over the past two years, the possibility of attacks and the successful hijacking of sailing vessels continue to remain high. This is due to the reduction of revenue sources from pirated merchant vessels and the fact that sailing yachts are vulnerable and easier targets. PAG's continue to conduct "soft approaches" on merchant ships transiting the area. Skiffs have approached vessels in order to probe the reaction of the crewmembers and any possible Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on-board. If the pirate approach does not elicit a response, the pirates will likely proceed with an attack, in which additional skiffs may participate. Vessels transiting the greater Gulf of Aden region should operate under a heightened state of alert. This is due to increasing tensions in the region, which in turn can escalate the potential for direct or collateral damage to vessels transiting the region. These threats may come from a number of different sources such as missiles, projectiles, or waterborne improvised explosive devices. Houthi rebels have claimed responsibility for the 1 October 2016 attack on a UAE vessel.

- 22.3. UMS HQ advises all vessels transiting this region to report any hostile activities immediately. Somali pirates have recently shown an ability to mount hijacking expeditions far out into the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, and inshore traffic might be an easier target. EUNAVFOR spokesperson Commander Jacqui Sherriff said that the recent series of attacks against commercial shipping again highlights the need for vigilance and adherence to self-protection measures (by the deployment of on-board AST) and compliance to Best Management Practices (BMP) 5. It is crucial that Somali pirates are denied opportunities to attack vessels so that there will no chance of a successful hijack. One successful hijack is one



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hijack too many because it will encourage and motivate more Somalis to taking up piracy!

22.4. CMF and EUNAVFOR and intelligence agencies have warned of increased complacency amongst stakeholders which may give rise to opportunities for piracy action groups and organizations funding piracy activities to revive the threat.

### **23. Actions to be Taken when a Vessel with On-Board UMS Maritime Marshals is Approached by a Naval Craft.**

23.1. On 16 Dec 23, in the face of increased attacks from pirate action groups and approaches from naval craft, UMS HQ issued the orders on actions to be taken when a naval craft approaches a vessel. These orders were issued to all Team Leaders, and they were further personally briefed by the UMS Operation Officer because of the importance of the subject and the requirement that these orders be fully understood and complied with.

23.2. UMS Maritime Marshals onboard a vessel are to protect the vessel and crew members from pirate action groups. They are equipped with weapons and equipment to handle the threat posed by pirate action groups and **ARE NOT MEANT TO DETER NOR OPPOSE ANY NAVAL CRAFT THAT MAY APPROACH THE VESSEL FOR WHATEVER PURPOSES.** The Orders is repeated in the paragraphs below.

23.3. If a naval craft approaches our vessel, the following actions will be taken.

23.3.1. The Team Leader is to alert and discuss the approach of the naval craft with the Master.

23.3.2. The Master must notify the vessel's owner/HQ of the situation.

23.3.3. The team Leader will notify the UMS Operations Officer/UMS HQ.

23.4. If the naval craft asks the vessel to stop, the Master will take the appropriate action, as per his discussion with his HQ.

23.4.1. Based on the decision to stop, the Team Leader will immediately give orders to his Maritime Marshal(s) to unload and clear their weapons.

23.4.2. **NO WEAPON WILL BE LOADED.**



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**23.4.3. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL ANY MEMBER OF THE MARITIME MARSHAL TEAM SHOW HIS WEAPON TO DETER THE NAVAL CRAFT, FIRE WARNING SHOTS, OR FIRE ANY SHOT AT THE APPROACHING NAVAL VESSEL. THE TEAM LEADER IS TO ENSURE THIS IS CLEARLY BRIEFED AND UNDERSTOOD TO HIS TEAM MEMBERS. THERE MUST BE NO DEVIATION FROM THIS ORDER.**

23.5. When the vessel stops as ordered and naval personnel come on board, UMS Maritime Marshals will take the following actions:

23.5.1. All Maritime Marshals should keep low on the deck and cover their head with both hands, with their hands visible. They will all be together, lined up side by side.

23.5.2. On no account should any Maritime Marshal make any movement that could be misinterpreted as hostile actions. Their individual weapon should be placed on deck next to the Maritime Marshal, and at no time should any Maritime Marshal handle his weapon.

23.5.3. Do not take any videos or photographs.

23.5.4. All Maritime Marshals should be ready to be questioned on their identity and roles. They will answer the questions truthfully and cooperate fully with the naval personnel on board.

23.5.5. The Team Leader will be the spokesperson of the Maritime Marshal Team, working closely with the Master.

23.6. Remember to be cooperative and calm. There is no need to be unduly concerned as the vessel and crew members, including the Maritime Marshal Team, have not committed any wrongdoing.

23.7. After the naval personnel depart and the vessel resumes its mission, the Team Leader reconstitutes the Team to continue the mission.

23.8. The Team Leader will report the matter to UMS HQ accordingly

## **24. Piracy in the Indian Ocean HRA has NOT Been Eradicated**

34.1. UMS HQ has always maintained this position not to give stakeholders a sense of false security. The current development of piracy raging its ugly head again in the waters off Somalia and in the Indian Ocean is testimony to the accuracy of our analysis.





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34.2. The decision by world shipping bodies such as BIMCO and the like has given the wrong perception that piracy in the Indian Ocean HRA has been eradicated. **Nothing can be further from the truth!**

34.3. Piracy threats have been reduced due to the strong presence and sustained effort by naval forces, namely EUNAVFOR and the US-led Combined Military Force (CMF) and the deployment of armed security teams (AST) onboard commercial vessels. The deployment of ASTs onboard commercial vessels since the peak of the piracy threat in 2008 has proven effective, as no vessel with an AST has ever been hijacked.

34.4. Naval and intelligence agencies think pirate syndicates lie low due to the strong deterrence and are involved in other forms of criminal activities, such as drug smuggling. These pirate and criminal syndicates have not been wiped out, and given the correct circumstances and environment, they can get their acts together quickly.

34.5. The pirate syndicates are privy to the announcement of the lifting of the HRA. They could view the situation in 2023 as a golden opportunity to resume their proven lucrative 'business'. The current political situation in the Middle East is a significant distraction to the naval forces that will not focus their attention and presence on the more critical military problems with the Iranian-backed Houthis.

34.6. Given Somalia's poor socio-economic situation, thousands of Somalians will be more than happy to take up arms to hunt and hijack commercial vessels again. The lack of local law enforcement to prevent piracy activities will make this revival a strong possibility. Therefore, the comeback scenario cannot be discounted and is a likely possibility.

34.7. Therefore, from a risk assessment point of view, the risk level in 2024, if deterrence measures are removed, the risk of piracy in 2024 will be objectively higher than in the last 5-6 years.

34.8. **Low piracy threat does not mean NO PIRACY THREAT!**

### 35. JMIC Guidance 4

35.1. The southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from 16N to 047E remain a threat area based on the Houthis ability to attack vessels with various capabilities.



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35.2. The threat remains focused on vessels with an Israeli, United States or United Kingdom association.

35.3. Free flow of commerce remains a top priority c. Defensive coalition strikes have been executed to reduce Houthis attack capabilities.

### **36. Pirates Board Bangladeshi Bulker in the Indian Ocean**

36.1. A group of suspected Somali pirates has reportedly boarded a bulker run by a company in Bangladesh and are now steering the vessel toward Somalia. The shipping company, SK Shipping Lines, part of the KSRM Group, is confirming the attack although details are limited currently.

36.2. The vessel now named Abdullah (58,000 dwt) was acquired in late 2023 by the company in Bangladesh from Japanese owners and only recently resumed sailing. Built in 2015, she is 623 feet (190 meters). A crewmember from the ship who was a former cadet at the country's Maritime Academy was able to send messages to one of his instructors including a video of the pirates' approach pleading for assistance.

36.3. The vessel was approximately 500 nautical miles east of Mogadishu, Somalia in an area the shipping company said was ranked as low risk. However, the pirates possibly affiliated with the Houthi in Yemen are believed to be expanding the region of operations.

36.4. The cadet said as many as 50 pirates had boarded the ship, although security services say it appears to be around 20 pirates. The bulker was sailing from Mozambique to the UAE and according to AIS signals was traveling at under 10 knots which would have made it an easy target. A crew of 23 is reported aboard and possibly locked in the citadel or their cabins. Reports are that there were two boats, one small and the other larger, that came alongside the bulker.

36.5. EUNAVOR ATLANTA which is the agency monitoring the region had previously warned of increased activity and danger in the Indian Ocean. Since November 2023, they have listed 20 incidents, including the commandeering of the bulker *Ruen* which remains in Somalia as well as the attempts on the product tanker *Central Park* with the boarders capture by



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U.S. forces and the bulker *Lila Norfolk* where the Indian Navy appeared to have scared off the boarders and later secured the ship.

36.6. Most of the incidents have been with small fishing vessels. Ten have been attacked and liberated, while six are listed as hijacked and at least one other reported a suspicious approach. EUNAVFOR has warned of the potential of the fishing boats being used as mother vessels to support attacks on commercial shipping.

36.7. The seizing of the Navibulgar vessel *Ruen* in December 2023 was the first successful boarding of a large commercial vessel off Somalia since 2017.

### **37. Pirated Bulk Carrier Sailing Towards Somali Coast, Adding to Fears of Piracy Resurgence**

37.1. The European Union's anti-piracy naval mission, Operation ATALANTA, has confirmed details of the piracy incident involving the Bangladesh-flagged bulk carrier *MV Abdullah* after it was captured in the Indian Ocean on Tuesday.

37.2. The ship was reported as being boarded by armed pirates while approximately 600 nautical miles east of Mogadishu, Somalia, during a voyage from Mozambique to the UAE. EUNAVFOR's Operation ATALANTA has been leading the response to the incident.

37.3. "The situation on board is that pirates have seized and taken its 23-member crew hostage. The crew is safe, and the action is still ongoing. The ship is sailing towards the Somali coast," EUNAVFOR said in an update. The statement added that one ATALANTA ship is currently shadowing the pirate vessel.

37.4. Martin Kelly, Head of Advisory at EOS Risk Group, wrote on "X" that the *MV Abdullah* has entered Somalia's exclusive economic zone. He says the ship's course corresponds with the last reported position of the pirated *MV Ruen*, which was hijacked on December 14 in a similar area to the *Abdullah*.



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- 37.5. According to media reports, the pirates have demanded a \$5 million ransom the *Abdullah's* release, threatening to start executing crew members if their demands are not met.
- 37.6. Authorities have warned for months that multiple pirate action groups are believed to be operating from motherships in the Indian Ocean, with an operational range of up to 1,000 nautical miles from Somalia. This revelation followed multiple hijackings of fishing dhows in the eastern Gulf of Aden and Somali basin in recent months.
- 37.7. The use of motherships to reach further offshore was a common tactic used by Somali pirates more than a decade ago.
- 37.8. These recent incidents seems to signal a resurgence of Somali-based piracy, further complicating shipping through the region as the Houthi terrorist group continues to attack merchant vessels in the Red Sea and western Gulf of Aden.
- 37.9. The hijacking of the *Ruen* in December marked the first successful hijacking of a commercial ship by Somali pirates since 2017. EU NAVFOR has suggested that the future of piracy in the region could hinge on the outcome of the case. If piracy proves profitable, it may spur a resurgence of pirate activities after monsoon season when conditions are more favorable for operating small craft.
- 37.10. EUNAVFOR ATALANTA remains dedicated to securing maritime safety in the Western Indian Ocean, having been a key player in combating piracy for the past 15 years. They recommend that vessels traversing this area adopt enhanced security measures and maintain communication with MSCHOA and UKMTO for updates on potential threats.

### **38. Pirates Want \$5M and Threaten to Kill Crew as Bulker is Taken to Somalia**

- 38.1. The pirates that boarded the Bangladesh-owned bulker *Abdullah* (58,000 dwt) have reportedly threatened the lives of the crewmembers if their ransom demands are not met. Government officials cautioned however that they have not yet been able to make contact with



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the boarders and expected that the ship would first be taken to a safe area before communication would be established.

38.2. Several government officials speaking with the local media said everything was being done at all levels of government and through international partners including India for the safe return of the crewmembers. They said however they did not have any information about the media reports that family members were told the lives of the crew are being threatened.

38.3. Media reports are saying the *Abdullah's* Chief Officer messaged family reporting the pirates said, "If the ransom is not paid, the crew will be shot dead one by one."

38.4. Unconfirmed media reports from family members also said the pirates had told the crew they wanted \$5 million from the government for the release of the ship. Reports are now saying that there are believed to be 22 pirates aboard the vessel with crewmembers telling family members the pirates have "heavy arms and ammunition."

38.5. Crewmembers were able to communicate with families before reporting that the pirates were confiscating mobile phones. They said that the crew had been rounded up and were being locked in a room with their phones taken. Officials from the company however said they had been able to make brief contact on Wednesday morning a day after the vessel was taken and that the crew was safe and physically unharmed. There are 23 Bangladeshi crewmembers aboard.

38.6. The Bangladesh Merchant Marine Officers Association told local media that through the use of international resources they had been able to locate the ship approximately 170 nautical miles east of Somalia although the pirates disabled the AIS signal and other systems that would permit tracking the ship. Initially, the ship was making just 5 knots but later Wednesday they reported it has increased speed to between 11 and 14 knots. The *Abdullah* appears bound for Garakad, Somalia, the same general area where the bulker *Ruen* was taken after it was [seized in December 2023](#).



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38.7. Based on current data, they are estimating the ship will arrive in Somalia on Thursday morning. The ship had been traveling from Mozambique with 58,000 tonnes of coal bound for the UAE. Officials of SR Shipping Line, a division of KSRM Group (Kabir Steel and Rolling Mill) said they were in close coordination with the government. They had notified the international authorities after they heard from the ship's officers midday on Tuesday that the ship was being boarded.

38.8. So far, the only communications the government said are through second parties. It was noted that another Bangladeshi vessel, the *Jahan Moni*, was taken in December 2010. The crew was recovered they said unharmed after 100 days.

38.9. The EU operation which for the past 15 years has been monitoring maritime security in the western Indian Ocean, EUNAVFOR Atalanta reports one of the vessels in its force is currently shadowing the bulker. Command for the operation said they are taking the lead and have been in contact with both Bangladeshi and Somali authorities. They are also coordinating with partners including the Indian Navy, which was successful in disrupting two previous attempted hijackings in 2024. They acknowledged the vessel is sailing toward the Somali coast and that "the action is ongoing.

### **39. Houthi Forces Keep Deploying Anti-Ship Missiles and Drone Boats**

39.1. After repeated American strikes against Houthi weaponry, the militant group continues to field anti-ship missile and drone capabilities to threaten traffic in the Red Sea. In the early hours of Monday morning, the group conducted another attempted missile strike: maritime security sources report that the group sent two ballistic missiles into the water near a merchant ship just north of the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb.

39.2. Later in the day, Houthi forces claimed responsibility for the attack. Spokesman Yahya Saree named the vessel the *Star Iris*, a Greek-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged bulker.



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39.3. Using Iranian-supplied weaponry and targeting assistance, Houthi forces have demonstrated a credible anti-ship capability, launching repeated strikes against merchant ships and warships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The group's antiship missiles have hit multiple vessels, causing extensive damage, and have come close to striking many more. Twice, Houthi munitions have managed to penetrate first-line air defense measures and get within range of the close-in weapons systems (CIWS) of allied U.S. and UK destroyers.

39.4. Given the potency of the threat to international shipping, the Biden administration has authorized the use of force against Houthi positions on the ground when required for "self-defense" purposes. U.S. Central Command has kept up a steady drumbeat of strikes on Houthi mobile missile launchers, suicide drone boats and one-way attack drones in Houthi territory, before the group has a chance to carry out further attacks.

39.5. On Saturday afternoon, from 1600-1700, CENTCOM forces struck two unmanned drone boats and three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles at positions north of Hodeidah, a Houth-controlled port city on the Red Sea.

39.6. U.S. Central Command assessed that these munitions posed an "imminent threat" to U.S. Navy vessels and merchant shipping. "These actions will protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for U.S. Navy and merchant vessels," the theater command said in a statement.

39.7. Houthi leadership claims to be carrying out its campaign against shipping interests in order to apply pressure to Israel's allies and secure a ceasefire in Gaza. The group claims to have strong popular support from Yemeni citizens.

#### **40. West Africa.**

40.1. Unlike the presence and substantial involvement of international navies, numbering more than 43 countries and the legit deployment of armed security team (AST) onboard commercial vessels transiting the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA, the situation in the West Africa HRA is about just the opposite. Nigerian government laws and regulations prohibit the deployment of ASTs other than those brokered by local security companies





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that used personnel from the Navy, which the government has declared as not supported by it. Besides the Nigerian Navy, there are also no other naval forces that provide security and deterrence to the pirates managed by criminal syndicates operating from Nigeria.

40.2. In other words, the waters and ports around Nigeria are almost a perfect hunting ground for the local criminal syndicates. Given this situation, the threat of piracy at this point of time is higher and more dangerous than that posed by Somali pirates in the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA, although depending on the continued presence of the navies of EUNAVFOR and CMF and the other independent naval forces and the continued used of on-board ASTs, the situation may quickly reverse. Somali pirates still have the intent, skills, and resources to attack merchant ships. Fundamentally naval forces and intelligence agencies have repeatedly called for continued vigilance and preparedness in the fight against the threat of piracy at both the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA and the West Africa HRA. Ignoring these warnings places one's business, vessels, and crew members at risk!

41. UMS HQ advises all stakeholders never to take the security and safety of their vessels and crew members for granted. **CURRENT LOW PIRACY THREAT doesn't mean NO PIRACY THREAT!**

42. ***Remember Always "Be Vigilant, Be Safe and Never Be Sorry"***

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